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This thesis proposes a decision-support process to facilitate a more comprehensive 
approach that U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) may adopt to reclaim control of 
Northern Mali from violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Specifically, the thesis 
explores the effectiveness of intervening with sustainable-development projects to deter, 
displace, or defeat VEOs. The author defines the problem through a systems approach by 
investigating the conditions that contribute to the Malian government’s lack of control, 
then uses a design approach to identify an intervention strategy. After prototyping 
possible solutions, the author explores U.S. policy and strategy to verify the feasibility of 
intervening via sustainable development initiatives. Finally, the author uses integer 
programming (IP) to formulate, solve, and interpret the intervention strategy. The author 
evaluates two IP models to allocate sustainable-development projects optimally for the 
purposes of rehabilitating desert lands, gaining compliance from non-state actors, and 
regaining control of ungoverned territories. This research finds that using a decision-
support process may help AFRICOM nest its strategy within the policy promoted by the 
U.S. ambassador to Mali. By doing so, AFRICOM may gain more influence in Northern 
Mali by pursuing a “whole of government” approach. 
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Over the past decade, the Malian government has engaged in counterterrorism (CT) 
operations1 that were initially successful. However, the government has focused on short-
term remedies that may eventually fail (e.g., the annual Flintlock exercises and other CT 
programs in the trans-Sahara).2 These fixes target symptoms; they do not address the root 
causes of the problem by establishing control over the ungoverned territories of Northern 
Mali. In addition, the Malian government has supported third-party interventions, such as 
French-led CT operations (as opposed to Malian- or West African-led military 
operations),3 while attempting to serve its national interests by tolerating cronyism in key 
cities. These narrowly focused quick fixes have led to widespread feelings of 
disenfranchisement and marginalization among the people.4 As a result, violent non-state 
actors (NSAs) continue to flout the government and destabilize the region, while the 
Malian government continues to apply “fixes that fail” that only serve to depress its 
nation-building capacities.  
Since the establishment of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007, U.S. 
military involvement in Northern Mali has been largely ineffectual. By focusing on CT 
                                                 
1 Counterterrorism (CT) operations are actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly 
to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. U.S. 
Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint 
Publication 1–02) (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2014), 60.    
2 Since 2006, the annual Flintlock training exercises involved over 15 regional state-actors’ militaries 
to maintain African partnerships and security apparatuses to deal with violent extremists and violent non-
state actors. Like Flintlock, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) executed other CT programs through 
the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). 
3 End-run interventions refer to fixes that bypass the barriers fundamental to the original problem. For 
example, the U.S. allocated approximately $119 million in fiscal year 2013 to deal with drought issues and 
conflict affected Malians. Even as the largest donor of humanitarian aid, the U.S. failed to deal with the 
violent extremists operating in Northern Mali. Additionally, the French and U.S. used end-run interventions 
(i.e., direct CT operations and support to CT operations respectively), despite the potential diversion of aid 
to terrorist groups. Alexis Arieff, Crisis in Mali (CRS Report R42664) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdf., 4. 
4 Before the military coup in 2012, successive U.S. administrations and many nongovernment 
observers viewed Mali as a democratic success, despite governance challenges—particularly in Northern 
Mali—and indications that the Malian public increasingly resented perceived state corruption and 
cronyism. Mali has been a longtime recipient of U.S. development aid, with modest gains achieved by 
health, education, and food security programs. Developments throughout 2012 bring into question the 
effectiveness of these programs. Ibid., 4. 
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operations, AFRICOM has supported short-term strategies to solve symptoms, not 
problems. Nor has AFRICOM used an inclusive decision-support process to evaluate the 
benefits of such actions (e.g., supporting CT exercises, programs, and operations). In 
short, AFRICOM has not justified the costs of operating in Northern Mali. This thesis 
proposes a decision-support process that AFRICOM may use to guide engagement in 
Northern Mali and regain control of ungoverned political spaces. By ensuring that a given 
course of action is nested within American policy, AFRICOM’s decision makers may 
garner more support from U.S. policymakers who do not favor military intervention in 
Mali (save for a few limited action concerning intelligence and logistics). 
The decision-support process reveals that AFRICOM is facing a “wicked 
problem,”5 in which decision makers offer competing solutions that are diametrically 
opposed and constraints are continuously changing. In the first step of the proposed 
decision-support process, the author uses a systems approach to investigate the conditions 
and variables that contribute to loss of control over ungoverned spaces and identifies a 
suitable long-term strategy. The fundamental problem lies in how to marginalize and 
disenfranchise dissident NSAs in Northern Mali, many of whom do not comply with the 
government, which has ceded control to violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in some 
places. AFRICOM must determine a long-term strategy that persuades NSAs to support 
the Malian government’s efforts to deter, displace, and defeat VEOs. 
The second step of the proposed decision-support process employs design 
thinking to identify courses of action. The design approach is a methodical, problem-
solving method for analysts to develop innovative solutions and create prototypes. Using 
the design approach, the author identifies sustainable development as a suitable approach 
for Northern Mali. 
                                                 
5 The literature suggests that a problem is truly wicked if it contains the following characteristics: (1) 
no agreement about the formulation of the problem; (2) no agreement on competing solutions (none of 
which have stopping rules to determine when the problem is solved); and (3) the complexity of the problem 
solving process grows out of control due to constantly shifting constraints. Jeff Conklin, Wicked Problems 
& Social Complexity (Napa, CA: CogNexus Institute, 2006); Russell L. Ackoff and Sheldon Rovin, 
Redesigning Society (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Nancy Roberts, “Wicked Problems 
and Network Approaches to Resolution,” International Public Management Review 1, no. 1 (2000), 1–19; 
Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4, 
no. 2 (1973): 155–169. 
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After defining the problem and solution, the author explores U.S. policy and 
strategy documents to verify the feasibility of pursuing sustainable-development projects. 
According to policy documents, sustainable development activities are acceptable to 
policymakers and the U.S. ambassador to Mali would likely approve them as well. 
Otherwise, by supporting the direct approach (that is, conducting counterterrorist 
operations), AFRICOM may continue to be perceived by the U.S. ambassador as an 
uncooperative player attempting to militarize U.S. policy there. 
Finally, the author compares the results of two integer-programming (IP) models 
that formulate, solve, and interpret the proposed solution via quantitative methods, 
identifying the optimal implementations of sustainable development in Northern Mali. 
Assuming that input is derived from key stakeholders and data are thoroughly vetted, 
decision analysts can use this method to recommend an optimal allocation of  
sustainable-development projects, based on rehabilitation metrics from each district (or 
commune)—for example, metrics reflecting the degradation of desert lands or level of 
threat from VEOs. The equation behind the rehabilitation scores allows the decision 
analyst to rate communes according to multiple factors, such as sustainable development 
indicators, terrorist activities, criminal activities, and threat information. Ultimately, this 
step in the decision-support process justifies the strategy of using sustainable 
development to combat terrorism and degradation of the desert environment 
(“desertification”) and substantiates various contributions to Mali’s nation-building 
efforts. 
This mixed-methods approach determines an optimal allocation of sustainable-
development projects implemented to regain control of Northern Mali. In particular, the 
IP model allocates the following four types of projects to key locations to halt 
desertification and exert control over ungoverned spaces. Appendix C adds further detail. 
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Project Design 1, the analyst assumes the following:  
1. Department of State (DOS)-led projects focus strongly on sustainable 
development; control is determined by the populace’s compliance with the 
government. 
2. The degree to which the government can maintain a permissive to 
uncertain environment is low,6 as is its ability to maintain a low VEO 
threat level. 
3. Zero to negligible use of external security/military forces (e.g., French and 
U.S.) is desired; instead, the indigenous security apparatus polices itself. 
For Project Design 2, the analyst assumes the following: 
1. DOS-led projects focus strongly on sustainable development; control is 
determined by the populace’s compliance with the government. 
2. The degree to which the government can maintain a permissive to 
uncertain environment is low,7 as is its ability to maintain a low VEO 
threat level. 
3. Minimal use of external security/military forces (e.g., French and U.S.) is 
desired; instead, the indigenous security apparatus polices itself. 
For Project Design 3, the analyst assumes the following: 
1. DOD- and DOS-led projects focus moderately on development. 
2. The hostility in the environment is uncertain; the VEO threat is moderate 
to high. 
3. Moderate use of external security or military forces (e.g., Economic 
Community of the West African States [ECOWAS]) is desirable. 
For Project Design 4, the analyst assumes the following: 
1. DOD-led projects focus moderately on development. 
2. The environment is hostile; VEO threat is high. 
3. Overt employment of security and military forces (e.g., Malian Defense 
Forces, ECOWAS, French, coalition support) is desirable. 
                                                 
6 The level of permissiveness in a commune is determined by assessing the operational environment, 
which is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of 
military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. A permissive environment suggests the 
host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist 
operations that a unit intends to conduct. An uncertain environment suggests the host government forces, 
whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective 
control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations. A hostile environment suggests 
the hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a 
unit intends to conduct. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1–02, 203.   
7 Ibid., 273.   
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Each IP model represents a course of action (COA) that AFRICOM could pursue. 
See Chapter VII for a COA comparison. For COA I, Model I allocates 24 projects, which 
consist of four project-design types (see Appendix C, Section D) and achieve the 
following: 
1. Model I allocates 24 projects to regain control of 65.7 percent of 
ungoverned territory.  
2. Model I rehabilitates desertified land with a 71.9 percent increase in land 
quality. 
3. The strength in this COA is its ability to provide reasonable coverage 
throughout Northern Mali. In particular, Model I controls Tombouctou 
significantly better than Model II. 
For COA II, Model II allocates 24 projects and regains control of 45.5 percent of 
ungoverned territory (20.2 percent less than COA I), and rehabilitates desertified land 
with a 68.5 percent increase in land quality. Ultimately, Model I generates a more 
optimal solution than Model II. 
Although only 24 of 47 communes (or districts) receive a project, the author 
compares two COAs that use an indirect approach to target VEOs in ways that may 
satisfy the U.S. ambassador and AFRICOM commander without endangering the 
indigenous population or the integrated country strategy. For example, as communes with 
a project draw in workers from other communes that were formerly VEO sanctuaries, the 
value of these places for hiding and regrouping decreases. Also, the jobs associated with 
sustainable development in one commune benefit other communes as employment in 
agriculture, infrastructure development, security, and other fields is shared. 
Ultimately, AFRICOM should nest its strategy with the policy espoused by the 
U.S. ambassador to Mali (i.e., the ambassador’s classified integrated country strategy). In 
doing so, AFRICOM may gain more influence in Northern Mali and achieve U.S. 
interests through a “whole of government” approach. This research develops a decision-
support process with which to explore a long-term strategy characterized by sustainable 
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U.S. decision makers are looking for stable footings on which to ground a 
redefinition of America’s role in the world arena, while carefully employing military 
forces across various regions of conflict. Ideally, strategic-decision makers and policy 
implementers pursue political objectives by integrating the instruments of national power, 
or “DIMEFIL” (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, 
intelligence, and legal domains), toward a specific purpose. U.S. decision makers have a 
full panoply of DIMEFIL instruments to use across a spectrum from military operations 
to operations other than war (OOTW).8 However, the global challenges of the
 
twenty-
first century have exposed the limitations of the U.S. national-security system in terms of 
how hard and soft powers are leveraged.9 Because of the sheer magnitude of the national-
security issues involved, this thesis limits its scope to the trans-Sahara (Sahel) region in 
Northern Mali. In doing so, the author hopes to emphasize the dangers of overreliance on 
“end runs”10 (i.e., direct military action) to intervene in problems as complex or wicked 
as regaining control of Northern Mali. 
                                                 
8 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Joint Publication 1–02) (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2014), A-140. 
9 Hard power is the use of coercive force, which is typically leveraged by the military and economic 
elements of the DIMEFIL. From Mao Zedong to Niccolò Machiavelli, hard power is that aggressive use of 
force to influence the behaviors or interests of others. Conversely, soft power is just about everything else; 
however, soft power may be leveraged by all elements of the DIMEFIL. In Chapter II, soft power is 
referred to as neocortical warfare, which Szafranski would suggest that DIMEFIL elements should strive to 
modify the behavior of enemy organisms without destroying the organisms. 
10 End-runs are simply informal attempts to conduct evasive maneuvers to achieve desired end results. 
The Project for National Security Reform argued that at times “…end runs work as short-term fixes; other 
times, however, they produce debacles like the Iran–Contra fiasco.” Project on National Security Reform, 
Project on National Security Reform: Forging a New Shield (Washington, DC: Project on National 
Security Reform, 2008), 29.  
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B. BACKGROUND OF NORTHERN MALI 
Over the past decade, the Malian government has engaged in counterterrorism (CT) 
operations11 that were initially successful. However, the government has focused on 
short-term remedies that may eventually fail (e.g., the annual Flintlock exercises and 
other CT programs in the Trans Sahara).12 These fixes targeted symptoms; they do not 
address the root causes of the problem by controlling the ungoverned territories of 
Northern Mali. Additionally, the Malian government supported third party interventions, 
such as French-led CT operations (as opposed to Malian- or West African-led military 
operations),13 while attempting to serve its national interests by tolerating cronyism in 
key cities. These narrowly focused quick fixes have led to widespread feelings of 
disenfranchisement and marginalization among the people.14 As a result, violent non-
state actors (NSAs) continue to flout the government and destabilize the region, while the 
Malian government continues to apply “fixes that fail,” which only serve to depress its 
nation-building capacities.  
In recent years, U.S. policymakers have identified Africa’s natural resources, 
especially energy and violent NSAs, respectively, as the key opportunities and threats 
that are strategically significant to American national interests. Growing concerns for 
North Africa’s numerous humanitarian crises and armed conflicts led Congress to create 
                                                 
11 Counterterrorism operations are actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to 
influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. U.S. Department 
of Defense, Joint Publication 1–02, 60. 
12 Since 2006, the annual Flintlock training exercises involved over 15 regional state-actors’ militaries 
to maintain African partnerships and security apparatuses to deal with violent extremists and violent non-
state actors. Like Flintlock, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) executed other CT programs through 
the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). 
13 End-run interventions refer to fixes that bypass the barriers fundamental to the original problem. 
For example, the U.S. allocated approximately $119 million in fiscal year 2013 to deal with drought issues 
and conflict affected Malians. Even as the largest donor of humanitarian aid, the U.S. failed to deal with the 
violent extremists operating in Northern Mali. Additionally, the French and U.S. used end-run interventions 
(i.e., direct CT operations and support to CT operations respectively), despite the potential diversion of aid 
to terrorist groups. Arieff, Crisis in Mali, 4. 
14 Before the military coup in 2012, successive U.S. administrations and many nongovernment 
observers viewed Mali as a democratic success, despite governance challenges—particularly in Northern 
Mali—and indications that the Malian public increasingly resented perceived state corruption and 
cronyism. Mali has been a longtime recipient of U.S. development aid, with modest gains achieved by 
health, education, and food security programs. Developments throughout 2012 bring into question the 
effectiveness of these programs. Ibid., 4. 
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a new military combatant command for Africa (AFRICOM) in 2007. Since 
decolonization in the 1960s,15 state-actors have been slow to address threats in North 
Africa; however, they now react in crisis mode, hoping to avoid “weaker” NSAs’ baited 
deterrence traps.16 
The fundamental U.S. policy question for Northern Mali is how AFRICOM can 
work with the DOS and Malian government to deter, displace, and defeat VEOs and 
violent NSAs. The key problem that AFRICOM faces is the Malian government’s lack of 
control over the Sahel’s ungoverned spaces. By not controlling the Sahel, Mali allows 
violent NSAs to strengthen their networks and combat power and create support zones 
from which to attack U.S. interests. Meanwhile, because the VEOs oscillate in and out of 
terrorist mode,17 the Malian government is always solving yesterday’s problems. 
Unconsciously, the Malian government operates under a “fixes that fail” 
framework, rather than developing networked coalitions and a collaborative strategy. 
Ultimately, the lack of control in the Sahel reflects Mali’s inability to provide incentives  
 
                                                 
15 Fischer-Tiné gave an anthropological definition of post-colonialism as the relations between nations 
and areas they colonized and once ruled. Following post-colonialism, the newly formed African 
governments were left with the border conflicts haphazardly created by former European rulers. Since then, 
African nations and their allies have struggled with the ongoing conflicts (e.g., border disputes, education, 
slavery, and much more), which detract from the dire need for sustainable development. Harald Fischer-
Tiné, “Postcolonial Studies,” Institute of European History, accessed May 12, 2014, http://ieg–
ego.eu/en/threads/europe–and–the–world/postcolonial–studies/harald–fischer–tine–postcolonial–
studies#citation. 
16 Adler aptly warned that a deterrence trap is a “structural situation that leaves social actors with the 
dreadful choice of reacting with force to a provocation that elicits response or practicing appeasement.” 
Emanuel Adler, “Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era,” Complex Deterrence: Strategy in 
the Global Age edited by T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, Chicago, IL: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2009, 85–108.  
17 The phrase “oscillate in and out of terrorist mode” alludes to the al-Suri model. Chief al-Qaida 
strategist, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, developed the al-manhaj model, which is a program that espouses the 
development of small, decentralized terrorist cells sprouting in hundreds of locations throughout the world. 
Arquilla described al-Suri’s objective as a “…goal to build enough small cells so that no single cell has to 
mount an attack more than, say, once per year.” He further explained that the cumulative effect of these 
small cells should “…achieve the desired terrorist drumbeat.” Therefore, commensurate with the al-Suri 
model, VEOs and supporting violent NSAs would remain dormant, “…until the heat [is] off, then strike 
again in a year or so.” Arquilla added that al-Suri’s limited scale of attacks conducted by these cells will 
cause “…disproportionate psychological trauma and one day achieve massive cumulative material effects.” 
John Arquilla, “Small Cells Vs. Big Data,” Foreign Policy, April 22, 2013; Jim Lacey, A Terrorist’s Call to 




for negotiation with the NSAs. Sustainable-development programs may provide a 
bargaining chip to help the Malian government negotiate for compliance and stability in 
the region.18  
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the efficacy of using a proposed 
decision-support process to inform AFRICOM decision makers as they deal with highly 
complex problems. By relying on qualitative and quantitative inputs to problems, 
AFRICOM may increase its influence over the problem set in Northern Mali. This thesis 
leverages systems and design thinking to frame a problem, identify coping strategies, and 
identify a point of intervention. Given the persistence of small wars throughout North 
Africa, this thesis explores also the strategic utility of using quantitative modeling to 
identify decision strategies for deterring, displacing, disrupting, and targeting violent 
extremist organizations (VEOs) and violent non-state actors (NSAs).  
While the implications are far reaching, the scope of this thesis is confined to 
analysis and recommendations for the wicked problem of Northern Mali. This research is 






                                                 
18 Throughout this thesis, the author refers to sustainable development in the context of “combating 
desertification,” which includes activities that are part of the integrated development of land in arid, semi-
arid and dry sub-humid areas for sustainable development which are aimed at the following: (a) prevention 
and/or reduction of land degradation; (b) rehabilitation of partly degraded land; and (c) reclamation of 
desertified land. Therefore, sustainable development represents desirable future state for the carrying 
capacity of natural systems with the socioeconomic challenges faced by human societies. In particular, 
sustainable development includes the concern for humanity, future generations, living conditions, and use 
of resources, without undermining the sustainability of the environment and natural systems. United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, “Desertification: The Invisible Frontline,” UNCCD 
Publications (23 January 2014, 2014). 
http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Publications/Desertification_The%20invisible_frontline.p
df.  
19 Decision modeling is a scientific approach to operationalize a real-world problem with the intent to 
facilitate the decision making process. 
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recommended strategy. Since the problems in North Africa tend to yield low-intensity 
conflicts,20 decision analysts currently rely on information dominance to inform their 
recommendations.21  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research treats the following fundamental question: Would AFRICOM gain 
more influence with policymakers if its development projects in Northern Mali were 
informed by analysis that can predict efficacy in regaining the ungoverned territories? In 
responding to the primary research question, the author addresses the following 
subordinate questions: 
1. Do sustainable-development projects increase the compliance of NSAs 
and eventual displacement of VEOs? 
2. What are the benefits of investing in development to support theater 
campaign plans, economic development, and indigenous security forces? 
3. How can sustainable development help build capacity to strengthen 
African partner nations? 
4. What is the efficacy of using systems and design thinking to identify 
problems, intervention points, and the residual effects of decision making? 
5. Is there strategic advantage in decision analysts’ using both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses to inform decision makers? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Overall, this research uses a mixed-methods approach towards the problem and 
follows a decision-support process with the following components:  
                                                 
20 According to FM 100–20/AFP 3–20, low-intensity conflict (LIC) is a political–military 
confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful 
competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and 
ideologies. LIC ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, 
employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. LIC are often localized, generally 
in the undeveloped countries, but contain regional and global security implications. Given the definition of 
LIC, let high intensity conflict be just about everything else. U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, Military 
Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Field Manual 100–20 / Air Force Pamphlet 3–20) (Arlington, VA: 
U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, 1990), 1.1–1.7. 
21 Arquilla applied a systems approach to focus the application of power generated by “information 
dominance.” Arquilla aptly explained that information dominance consists of “knowing everything about 
an adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about oneself.” Therefore, as the U.S. 
operates in Africa, it must decisively enhance its strengths while debilitating its opponents. John Arquilla, 
“The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance,” Strategic Review 22, no. 3 (1994), 24–30, 25. 
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1. A systems approach to frame the problem (Step I) 
2. A design approach to identify an intervention (Step II-A) 
3. An evaluation of policy and strategy to identify limitations (Step II-B) 
4. Use of integer programming (IP) to model the problem (Steps III and IV) 
For the first step, this research employs a qualitative method (i.e., systems 
thinking) to investigate the conditions and variables that allowed VEOs and violent NSAs 
to gain control of the region. This systems approach allows the identification of a point of 
intervention and a suitable long-term strategy. The second step of the decision support 
process applies design thinking to identify an intervention. The design approach is a 
methodical problem-solving method that allows the decision analyst to develop 
prototypes of innovative interventions. After defining the problem and solution, this 
thesis explores U.S. policy and strategy documents to assess the feasibility of intervening 
with sustainable-development projects. Finally, an IP to formulate, solve, and interpret 
interventions is demonstrated. IP modeling is a quantitative method for modeling the 
implementation of sustainable development in Northern Mali. 
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The systems approach identifies AFRICOM’s continual use of short-term fixes, 
which cause unintended consequences: for example, military intervention has encouraged 
violent NSAs to cede control of ungoverned territories to VEOs. Additionally, the 
systems approach identifies sustainable development as an intervention with feasible 
long-term prospects of rehabilitating desertified rural areas, increasing employment, and 
regaining control of the political space. Focusing on a long-term strategy is expected to 
mitigate the unintended consequences brought on by quick fixes. Assuming AFRICOM 
refocuses its support to sustainable development, the design approach will allow the 
analyst to develop prototypes of sustainable-development projects in Northern Mali.  
After numerous trials of prototyping during this research, four sustainable 
development-project designs (P1, P2, P3, and P4) merged. These designs account for 
DOS-led versus DOD-led sustainable development, as well as the various levels of threat 
and land degradation across Northern Mali. The third and fourth steps of the decision-
support process identify IP as an acceptable method of operationalizing the problem. 
  
 12 
Overall, this mixed-methods approach determines an optimal allocation of sustainable-
development projects aimed at regaining control of Northern Mali. In particular, the 
model allocates projects to key locations to combat desertification and control 
ungoverned spaces. Finally, each IP model represented a course of action (COA) that 
AFRICOM could pursue: 
COA I: Model I allocates 24 projects, which consist of four project-design types 
(P1, P2, P3, and P4) and achieves the following: 
1. Model I allocates 24 projects to regain control of 65.7 percent of 
ungoverned territory.  
2. Model I rehabilitates desertified land with a 71.9 percent increase in land 
quality. 
3. The strength in this COA is its ability to provide a reasonable amount of 
coverage throughout Northern Mali. In particular, Model I controls 
Tombouctou significantly better than Model II. 
COA II: Model II allocates 24 projects, which consist of four project-design 
types. Model II regains control of 45.5 percent of ungoverned territory (20.2 percent less 
than COA I), and rehabilitates desertified land with a 68.5 percent increase in land 
quality. 
Although only 24 of 47 communes (or districts) “received” a project in this virtual 
allocation, the IP models operate under the assumption that the Department of State 
(DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) will use an indirect approach to target VEOs 
in ways that satisfy the U.S. ambassador and the AFRICOM commander without putting 
the indigenous population or the integrated country strategy at risk. For example, 
communes with a project would draw in workers from other communes to deny VEOs 
sanctuaries from which to hide and regroup. 
G. THESIS ROADMAP 
Chapter II of this thesis summarizes decision-modeling techniques and 
demonstrates integer programming’s capabilities in modeling conflicts. Chapter III 
presents the first step in the proposed decision-support process, explaining the systems 
approach as a way to frame problems and proposing the design approach to identify an 
intervention based on sustainable development. Chapter IV examines U.S. policies and 
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strategies to verify sustainable development as consistent with U.S. objectives and 
interests. Chapter V details the fourth step in the decision support process, integer 
programming. Chapter VI uses a type of integer programming (i.e., binary integer 
programming or BIP) to model two COAs for the conflict in Northern Mali. Chapter VII 
analyzes and synthesizes the model inputs and outputs and presents an analysis to 
determine how sensitive the optimal solution is to changes in threat conditions, available 
resources, and land and other development factors. Chapter VIII provides conclusions 
and recommendations for future research. Appendices A, B, and C further explain the 
major concepts of systems and design thinking, while appendices D, E, F, and G provide 
information regarding the input variables in the BIP model. Appendix H illustrates the 
set-up for Model I and Model II in Frontline Systems’ Risk-Solver Platform (RSP) add-in 
tool. Appendix I explains the inspiration behind the constraints in the two BIP models, 
and Appendix J provides an abridged history of Northern Mali for those not familiar with 
the problem set. Finally, in Appendix K, the author illustrates a recent direct approach 





II. ABOUT INTEGER PROGRAMMING 
This chapter provides a background on integer programming (Step IV) before 
launching into the decision-support analytic process. The ability to model real-world 
scenarios is especially vital as U.S. decision makers deal with the small-war conflicts of 
the twenty-first century.22 While quantitative modeling techniques can help to cope with 
complex problems, decision analysts must be cautious of the limitations, assumptions, 
and applicability of this modeling approach. Any quantitative approaches used to model 
scenarios and identify optimal courses of action should remain flexible, economical, 
widely acceptable, and relatively simple to adapt.  
A. DECISION MODELING 
Since Frederick W. Taylor pioneered the “principles of the scientific approach to 
management” in the early 1900s and the military’s successful use of these developments 
in World War II, various industries have employed similar techniques in managerial 
decision-making and planning,23 and decision modeling continues to shape the 
battlefield. Decision modeling operationalizes real-world problems to facilitate the 
decision-making process. While decision analysts from various backgrounds may refer to 
decision modeling as quantitative analysis, management science, or operations 
research,24 this thesis adopts the term “decision modeling,” because the analysts in this 
scenario leverage the model in an executive decision-making context. With this aim of 
influencing decision makers, this chapter supplies context to Step IV in the framework 
for decision-maker support. 
                                                 
22 The term operationalize refers to the notion of modeling a phenomenon that may not be directly 
quantifiable. Therefore, the author proposes a “decision support framework” to define abstract concepts to 
lend more clarity to theoretical concepts. Furthermore, decision analysts can define what issues are within 
scope for the model and what is out of scope. 
23 Nagrai Balakrishnan, Barry Render, and Ralph M. Stair, Managerial Decision Modeling with 
Spreadsheets (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2007), 2. 
24 Ibid., 2. 
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B. DETERMINISTIC MODELING 
To analyze a problem by treating a yield as a random variable, a decision analyst 
requires the use of complicated stochastic (or probabilistic) programming models; 
however, analysts normally use a deterministic model, in which the random variables in 
the yield function are replaced by either their most likely values or expected values.25 
Whether analysts choose to operationalize a conflict with probabilistic or deterministic 
modeling techniques, they must understand the risks, levels of certainty and uncertainty, 
and assumptions. Determining the correct actions to take during a conflict can be quite 
difficult; therefore, this research relies on deterministic modeling as the starting point for 
solving an enduring problem. An envoy of facilitators cannot go into negotiations without 
proper preparation and thoughtful recommendations, and certainly an executive decision 
maker should never make decisions without proper information. 
Through deterministic modeling, decision analysts gather relevant input-data 
values that exhibit certainty. To determine an appropriate level of sustainable 
development, analysts require data sets of known, fixed resources to use in selecting the 
best sites for sustainable development in conflict regions. Analysts can determine the 
specific amounts of resources needed to establish a development, based on project and 
environmental design specifications (e.g., population density, water resources, water-
table levels, land arability, and precipitation). In addition, analysts can determine the net 
benefits or profit contributions of their proposed sustainable-development operations. 
C. MATHEMATICAL MODELING 
Mathematical programming is a widely acclaimed decision-modeling technique 
that assists the decision analyst in offering recommendations to decision makers by 
identifying an optimal course of action. Although several optimal choices may exist, 
through mathematical programming the decision maker can make an informed choice out 
                                                 
25 Katta G. Murty, Operations Research: Deterministic Optimization Models (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1994), 9.  
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of many possible decisions or combinations of choices, all other things being equal.26 
What sets decision modeling apart from other modeling techniques is that the models are 
sets of mathematical relationships, which analysts express as equations and inequalities. 
To prototype a mathematical model, this research uses Microsoft Excel spreadsheets to 
analyze computations (see Appendix H). Although software-modeling packages are 
useful, analysts and decision makers do not require sophisticated mathematical ability, 
and basic algebra is used in this thesis. 
D. LINEAR PROGRAMMING 
This section focuses on the assumptions behind Step IV as regards formulation, 
solution, and interpretation. Figure 1 illustrates the fourth step of the overall decision-
support process. 
 
Figure 1.  Step IV—A Decision-Modeling Approach27 
                                                 
26 John W. Carroll, “Natural Laws in Scientific Practice,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 71, no. 1 (2005): 240–245, doi:10.1111/j.1933–1592.2005.tb00446.x. In other words, ceteris 
paribus acknowledges that the mathematical programming model can fail due to intervening factors; 
however, this scientific assumption allows the analyst to filter factors. 
27 Balakrishnan, Render, and Stair, Managerial Decision Modeling with Spreadsheets, 5. 
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A widely used optimization technique, linear programming (LP) allows decision 
analysts to determine feasible plans, which are optimal with respect to a certain agreed-
upon linear-objective function. In particular, it determines a plan that maximizes or 
minimizes some linear function over all possible feasible plans.28 For Northern Mali, 
analysts can plausibly support decision makers through George D. Dantzig’s 
development of simplex algorithms, which are the mathematical formulation of LP 
models and simple optimization algorithms.29 Ultimately, LP involves the selection of 
activities to obtain an optimal program or plan. In general, this thesis uses an evaluation 
function that is subject to multiple constraints (see Chapter VI). 
Since the complex problems of the twenty-first century are difficult to approach 
expeditiously by hand, decision analysts rely on technology for assistance. This research 
uses simple spreadsheet-based applications to help decision analysts develop advanced 
LP methods that accommodate varying levels of complexity. The programming model 
presented relies heavily on Microsoft Excel with advanced solver add-ins. 
1. Basic Assumptions 
Should decision analysts choose the deterministic modeling approach, they must 
reevaluate the realism of leveraging LP. In general, analysts can logically use LP when 
the following four assumptions hold: certainty, proportionality, additivity, and 
divisibility.  
First, in relying on data characterized by certainty (i.e., census reports and 
sustainable-development statistics30), the literature supports the assumption that LP 
models can serve as an initial platform from which to amend the model after negotiation 
meetings, site surveys, and refinements to information and intelligence gathering. The 
                                                 
28 Vincent A. Sposito, Linear and Nonlinear Programming, 1st ed (Ames, IA: Iowa State University 
Press, 1975), 8–9. 
29 Balakrishnan, Render, and Stair, Managerial Decision Modeling with Spreadsheets, 20. 
30 United Nations, 2012 FAO Statistical Yearbook: Chapter 4—Sustainability Dimensions (Rome, 
Italy: FAO of the UN, 2012); City Population, “Population Statistics for Countries, Administrative Areas, 
Cities and Agglomerations—Interactive Maps—Charts,” City Population, accessed May 05, 2014, 
http://www.citypopulation.de/Mali.html; The World Bank Group, “World Bank Climate Variability Tool,” 




values used to derive the objective function and constraints are known with certainty and 
remain static throughout the application of the model. A static model involves 
determining an optimum solution for a one-period problem. Therefore, with each phase 
of the negotiations process, decision analysts continually update the LP model and 
sensitivity analysis. With each update, analysts should verify the underlying assumptions 
of certainty, which requires that responses to variable values be exactly equal to the 
responses represented by the coefficients. 
Second, the LP model operates under the assumption that proportionality exists in 
the objective function and constraints. For example, if the establishment of one small 
sustainable project consists of digging three wells, then three projects should yield nine 
wells. 
The third assumption, additivity, means that the total quantity of sustainable-
development projects should equal the sum of the individual activities. Therefore, the 
objective function will minimize or maximize the total quantity of projects. 
Divisibility, the fourth assumption, allows decision variables to be fractions. In 
some cases, the decision analyst may not want a solution to take the form of a fraction. 
The decision variables (or choice variables) are the unknown entities in a 
problem, which the decision analyst must solve to find values. Commensurate with any 
decision-modeling to assist leaders dealing with Northern Mali, the analyst should 
express the decision variables in simple alphanumeric symbols (e.g., xij). 
2. Linear-Programming Properties 
The first LP property is the optimization function, also known as the criterion or 
objective function, which represents some goal in a problem set. For example, an LP 
model allows the decision analyst to allocate projects across various locations in Northern 
Mali, based on rehabilitation scores, to target VEOs and violent NSAs. In this case, the 
objective is to maximize the total amount of rehabilitation in Northern Mali. 
The second LP property deals with constraints, which limit the degree to which 
decision analysts can achieve a proposed objective. For example, in the selection of some 
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number of sustainable-development projects, the analyst must ensure that the 
minimization or maximization of the objective is subject to limited resources (or 
constraints). This research considers the constraints of supply, demand, adjacency (or set 
covering), binary restrictions, and non-negativity. The constraints property is perhaps the 
most powerful and flexible aspect of the model, because it allows the analyst to mimic 
the conditions peculiar to a particular problem set. The model is limited to the 
imagination of the analyst (see Appendix J) and the clarity with which the decision maker 
provides guidance and restrictions. By expressing independent or dependent constraints 
as mathematical equations or inequalities, the analyst can mold the model to a particular 
situation. 
Much of the power behind LP modeling comes from its third property: the ability 
to determine alternative courses of action. The LP models in this research allow decision 
makers to optimally select, reject, and allocate limited resources.  
The fourth property of linear mathematical relationships allows the decision 
analyst to express a problem in terms of linear inequalities or equations; for the objective 
function and constraints, the LP model expresses the equations as first-degree linear 
functions. The capacity to express constraints as linear equations or inequalities provides 
flexibility in adapting the LP model to various situations. 
E. INTEGER PROGRAMMING 
Another form of linear programming, known as integer programming (IP), solves 
problems that require all variables to yield non-negative, integer values. These values 
represent a special case of discrete valued variables, which the decision analyst restricts 
to assuming a value from a specified discrete set.31 In general, analysts can leverage pure 
IP, mixed IP, pure BIP, and mixed BIP.  
With pure IP modeling, every decision variable must have an integer solution. For 
example, in recommending a total maximum quantity of sustainable-development 
projects to optimally control political space, decision analysts cannot recommend that 
                                                 
31 Murty, Operations Research: Deterministic Optimization Models, 5. 
  
 20 
23.5 sites receive a project. Instead, they create IP modeling constraints that force them to 
assign an integer value of 23 or 24. By rounding the LP solution, the analyst might not 
yield an optimal IP solution, and the IP objective function value is typically less optimal 
than the LP value. By contrast, mixed-IP modeling does not require that all decision 
variables yield integer solutions, and with mixed BIP, the analyst can model the problem 
to allow some decision variables to be binary, general integer, or continuous values. The 
model presented in this thesis is a pure BIP model, which dictates that all decision 





III. PART I–THE DECISION-SUPPORT PROCESS: A 
QUALITATIVE REVIEW–A 
This chapter focuses on two qualitative approaches to solving the problem of 
control over Northern Mali, covering the following steps: 
1. A systems approach to frame the problem (Step I) 
2. A design approach to identify a solution (Step II-A) 
Figure 2 illustrates the overall decision-support process. 
 
Figure 2.  A Framework to Support Decision Makers32 
Using qualitative analysis, an analyst can frame and identify the conditions and 
variables that led to the government’s loss of control in Northern Mali. The problem set 
has many uncertain qualitative factors, especially in the initial formulation of the 
                                                 
32 Balakrishnan, Render, and Stair, Managerial Decision Modeling with Spreadsheets, 5. The author 




problem. The analyst may run into difficulties with defining the problem, developing a 
model, acquiring input data, developing a solution, testing the solution, analyzing the 
results, and more.33 Therefore, this thesis promotes systems and design thinking to frame 
the problem, identify an intervention point, and prototype the intervention. After applying 
qualitative approaches to a problem, an analyst can justifiably use quantitative analysis or 
program modeling to offer a solution. 
A. STEP I-A. FRAME: A PRIMER 
The situation in Northern Mali is wicked: that is, there is (1) no agreement about 
the formulation of the problem; (2) no agreement on competing solutions (none of which 
have stopping rules to determine when the problem is solved); and (3) the complexity of 
problem solving spins out of control due to constantly shifting constraints.34 Churchman 
uses “wicked problems” to describe those that are “…difficult to solve because of 
incomplete, contradictory information and design parameters.”35 Ritell and Webber 
further refine the term to describe problems that cannot be definitively described or 
definitively and objectively answered.36 
In Appendix A, the author discusses the nature of the changing constraints in 
Mali, as negotiators and other facilitators mediate between many parties who come and 
go, change their minds, fail to communicate, or otherwise change the rules by which the 
problem might be solved.37 This thesis asserts that the Malian government is dealing with 
a wicked problem in Northern Mali, and the suggestions for coping and regaining control 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 13–15. 
34 Jeff Conklin, Wicked Problems & Social Complexity (Napa, CA: CogNexus Institute, 2006); Russell 
L. Ackoff and Sheldon Rovin, Redesigning Society (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); 
Nancy Roberts, “Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution,” International Public 
Management Review 1, no. 1 (2000), 1–19; Horst WJ Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a 
General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (1973), 155–169. 
35 Charles West Churchman, “Guest Editorial: Wicked Problems,” Management Science 14, no. 4 
(1967). 
36 Nancy Roberts, “Tackling Wicked Problems in Indonesia: A Bottom-Up Design Approach to 
Reducing Crime and Corruption,” (2012), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34423, 1–2; Rittel and Webber, 
Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 155–169.  
37 Nancy Roberts, “Coping with Wicked Problems: The Case of Afghanistan,” Research in Public 
Policy Analysis and Management 11 (2001), 353–375. 
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are based on that framing of the situation. Identification of Northern Mali’s problems as 
wicked justifies the use of the decision-support process in Figure 2. 
B. STEP I-B. FRAME: SYSTEMS APPROACH 
Step I continues the procedure for framing the problem by applying the systems 
approach. Figure 3 illustrates how the systems approach feeds into the design approach 
and decision modeling. 
 
Figure 3.  Step I—Frame: A Systems Approach 
Key terms associated with the systems approach are highlighted in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Coping with Wicked Problems: the Systems Approach 
Terms Attributes Definitions 





Behavior over time 
(BOT) 
 
Causal loop diagram 
(CLD) 
 
Polarity (positive and 
negative) 
The systems approach encompasses a large, 
amorphous body of methods, tools, and 
principles, all oriented to look at the 
interrelatedness of positive and negative forces, 
and seeing them as part of a common process.38 
Also, it represents the fifth discipline, which 
integrates with Senge’s other four disciplines: (1) 
personal mastery (2) mental models, (3) building 
a shared vision, and (4) team learning.39 
                                                 
38 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning 
Organization (New York: Random House, 1994), 89. 
39 Ibid., 89. 
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In applying a systems approach to framing the Malian problem, the decision 
analyst should first consider behavior over time (BOT) diagrams to clarify the nonlinear, 
interrelated behavior of variables. Although the BOT diagrams devised for this case study 
are speculative, due to lack of data from analysts observing the conflict, the development 
of a causal-loop diagram (CLD) helps identify possible reinforcing and balancing in the 
overall structure. Between the BOT diagram and CLD, analysts have a starting point for 
system behavior and dynamics (see Appendix B). 
The BOT diagrams and CLD are only the beginning; decision analysts also need 
to collect data to simulate and verify the system’s structure and make necessary 
modifications for further analysis. While qualitative and quantitative results facilitate 
timely decision making (with a CLD simulation), analysts still must constantly reassess 
the dynamic structure, look for repeating patterns of quick fixes (e.g., CT operations), 
determine how often these fixes occur, and compare their findings against the frequency 
with which the Malian government typically appraises its performance. Ultimately, 
sponsors, conveners, and analysts must remain vigilant against conceptual blocks that 
make us “prisoners of the system or prisoners of our own thinking.”40 The CLD suggests 
that if leaders fail to intervene appropriately and stabilize the Sahel expeditiously, a 
vicious cycle of unintended consequences will occur. This dilemma compounds if leaders 
fail to take timely action, because the opportunities and threats presented will likely 
change drastically over time. For a detailed explanation of the systems approach, see 
Appendix B. 
C. STEP II-A. IDENTIFY: DESIGN APPROACH 
This section identifies Step II-A in the decision-support process. Figure 4 
illustrates the generative process of using systems and design thinking to eventually 
identify, prototype, and verify a solution. 
                                                 
40 Senge, The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization, 




Figure 4.  Step II—A Framework to Support Decision Makers 
Key terms regarding the design approach are highlighted in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Coping with Wicked Problems: Design Approach.  
Terms Attributes Definitions 























The design approach is a data-driven, 
collaborative, problem-solving process that 
invites people who live with the problem to 
frame it, establishes the parameters and 
constraints of the solution search, identifies 
creative ideas as solutions, rapidly prototypes 
and tests solutions in the field, collects feedback, 
and reframes problems and solutions wherever 
the data-driven process (not ideology) leads.41 
Buchanan summarizes it as “the systematic 
approach to the invention of possibilities.”42 
Additionally, Brown and Wyatt suggest that 
design is a system of overlapping spaces, 
particularly the inspiration and ideation spaces.43 
Brown suggests that, at its core, design is a 
human-centered approach to problem solving, or 
what some have referred to as the “return of 
human beings to the center of the story.”44 
                                                 
41 Roberts, “Tackling Wicked Problems in Indonesia,” 2–3. 
42 Richard Buchanan, “Wicked Problems in Design Thinking,” Design Issues 8, no. 2 (Spring, 1992, 
1992), 5–21, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1511637, 13. 
43 Tim Brown and Jocelyn Wyatt, “Design Thinking for Social Innovation,” Development Outreach 
12, no. 1 (2010): 29–43. 
44 Tim Brown, Change by Design: How Design Thinking Transforms Organizations and Inspires 
Innovation (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 39. 
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First, decision analysts should define key interrelated variables to segue into the 
major causal factors in the problem. Next, they should explore the application of 
interventions (e.g., the unintended consequences) in the wicked problem. Provided that 
the intervention represents long-term investments, analysts must explore whether the 
government can propose a new idea that will be widely accepted and serve as a 
cornerstone of sustainable development. Finally, decision analysts should prototype the 
new idea to dissuade opponents from dismissing the intervention. 
From one perspective, the Malian government entered wicked-problem territory 
when violent NSAs began collaborating to destabilize Northern Mali. A perfect storm 
occurred when the NSAs pursued “coping strategies” by rebelling against the government 
to save their identity. For example, the Tuareg tribes traditionally lived a nomadic 
lifestyle and generally espouse a Berber/Muslim worldview. But due to lack of 
government support in rural desert areas, the Tuaregs are progressively living more 
sedentary lives. Recognizing the Tuaregs’ feeling of disenfranchisement and 
marginalization, al-Qaida promulgated its brand and vision of Islam under the guise of 
honoring the Tuareg identity, and al-Qaida operatives have made a concerted effort to 
provide minor humanitarian aid and marry into the Tuareg tribes.45 
Although the Malian government and its allies recognized that a problem existed, 
decision makers responded with quick-fix CT operations that ignored unintended 
consequences and exacerbated the original problem (e.g., French–Malian CT operations 
targeted VEOs; however, the government failed to provide basic and essential services to 
its citizens in the rural areas of Northern Mali). The government focused on terrorist 
symptoms—which had a tendency to subside for a short period and then reappear—
instead of long-term, sustainable-development projects, including political, economic, 
social, and military interventions aimed at reducing violence, famine, and economic 
                                                 
45 For example, Mokhtar Belmokhtar has become effective in the Sahel, because he has married four 
women from prominent Tuareg and Bérabiche families. His wives’ families and clans have provided him 
with refuge and their protection, making it more difficult for him to be apprehended. Ricardo René 
Larémont, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and counterterrorism in the Sahel,” African 
Security 4, no. 4 (2011), 242–268, 249.  
Tim Brown and Jocelyn Wyatt, “Design Thinking for Social Innovation,” Development Outreach 12, 
no. 1 (2010), 29–43. 
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disparities. Had long-term fixes geared toward sustainable development been 
implemented, decision makers could have broken the cycle of endlessly tackling 
unsolvable symptoms and the government could have begun taking comprehensive 
approaches to address a “systems of problems.”46 However, the government must be 
willing to invite all of the key stakeholders into a negotiations and consensus building 
session to even comprehend the complex systems of problem. Armed with information 
from negotiation with key stakeholders, design teams then devote maximal energy and 
time to explore the causal and systemic problems. In addition, conveners and decision 
makers can finally develop guidance, policies, and strategies that tackle the unintended-
consequence variable efficaciously. Using the design approach, this thesis asserts that 
interventions of sustainable development have superior potential to materialize and solve 
root problems. For a detailed explanation of the design approach, see Appendix C. 
                                                 
46 Russell L. Ackoff, Redesigning the Future (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 1974). 
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IV. PART II–THE DECISION SUPPORT PROCESS: 
QUALITATIVE REVIEW–B 
Moving beyond a systems approach to framing the problem and a design 
approach to identifying an intervention, this chapter focuses on Step II-B of the decision-
support process: evaluating a policy and strategy to identify limitations. 
A. STEP II-B. IDENTIFY: EVALUATE U.S. POLICY AND STRATEGY 
The political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard 
for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of 
effort to be made.47 
Once decision analysts define a problem using systems and design thinking, they 
should ensure that the intervention corresponds with U.S. policies and strategies, with all 
its nuances. Liddell Hart defined strategy as “…the art of distributing and applying 
military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”48 Analysts should view war with a “whole-
of-government approach,” i.e., via the prism of PMESII or political, military, economic, 
social, infrastructural, and informational dimensions.49 As politicians and diplomats 
create policy, AFRICOM can develop strategies to inform policy, in a perpetual feedback 
loop. In the grand scheme, the president’s national-security strategy serves as the point of 
departure for policy and strategy. This section explores how policy and strategy 
converge. Military strategies should be nested with policy—but are there any tangible or 
intelligible directives to which analysts can link their plans?  
1. Policy Documents 
At a minimum, analysts must review relevant U.S. policy and strategic 
documents, including the following:  
1. National Security Strategy (NSS) 
                                                 
47 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (New York: Digireads Publishing, 2004), 28. 
48 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London, UK: Faber, 1967), 335. 
49 John Langton and Subrata Das, A Framework for Building and Reasoning with Adaptive and 




2. Quadrennial Diplomacy & Development Review (QDDR) 
3. DOS Bureau of African Affairs (S-AF) 
4. DOS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (S-NEA) 
5. U.S. Ambassador to Mali: Integrated Security Plan 
Table 3 briefly annotates these documents. 
Table 3.   U.S. Policy: Analyzing Key Documents 





The NSS is published by the executive branch of the U.S. 
government, and it is intended to be a comprehensive 
statement articulating the worldwide interests, goals, and 




   
QDDR 
(Policy) 
2010 The QDDR is a blueprint of using “civilian power” to 
advance national interests and to be a better partner to the 
U.S. military. Civilian power is directing and coordinating the 
resources of all America’s civilian agencies to prevent and 
resolve conflicts; help countries lift themselves out of poverty 




   
S-AF (Policy) 2014 The S-AF is focused on the development and management of 
U.S. policy concerning Africa, along the following four 
pillars: strengthening democratic institutions; supporting 
African economic growth and development; advancing peace 
and security; and promoting opportunity and development. 52 
   
S-NEA 
(Policy) 
2014 The S-NEA tackles regional foreign policy issues: peace, 
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and political / 
economic reform.53 
   
                                                 
50 President Barack Obama, 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 2010). 
51 U.S. Department of State, 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy & Development Review (Washington, DC: 
Department of State, 2010a). 
52 U.S. Department of State, “Bureau of African Affairs: Our Mission,” Department of State, Bureau 
of Public Affairs, accessed 05 February, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/af/188266.htm.  
53 U.S. Department of State, “Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs; Regional Policy,” U.S. Department of 
State, accessed May 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/. The NEA’s regional policy is a classified 
document; therefore, the author accessed the NEA’s unclassified strategic vision on regional policy. 
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Policy Date Purpose 








2014 The plan suggests that bilateral development aims to 
strengthen democracy, promote human rights, protect the 
environment and improve health care and education. The U.S. 
will reengage Malian security institutions and military 
assistance, while prioritizing security sector reform, 
professional norms, reassertion of civilian authority, 
accountability mechanisms, and the rule of law. With the 
international community and the new Malian government, the 
U.S. will support comprehensive solutions that promote 
development and security throughout Mali.54 
2. Strategic documents: 
The strategic documents needed for thorough analysis of the wicked problem 
include the following: 
1. National Defense Strategy (NDS) 
2. National Military Strategy (NMS) 
3. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
4. AFRICOM Posture Statement 
5. JSOTF-TS Mission  
Table 4 lists the purpose of each strategy document. 
Table 4.   U.S. Strategy: Analyzing Key Documents 
Strategy  Date Purpose 
NDS  JAN 
2012 
The NDS sets priorities for defense to sustain global 
leadership, while reflecting the president’s strategic direction. 
It is informed by its civilian and military leadership.
55 
 
   
NMS FEB The NMS is a vision for joint force employment of capabilities 
                                                 
54 Leonard, Mary Beth, “U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Mali: Embassy’s Bilateral Assistance 
Programs,” accessed September 6, 2014, http://mali.usembassy.gov/statement_09062013.html. The 
ambassador’s integrated country strategy is classified; therefore, the author accessed the U.S. ambassador’s 
website to acquire a high level vision on bilateral assistance. The integrated security strategy (ICS) is the 
consideration of U.S. national security through the interrelationship among the security of the existence of 
Mali. In particular the ICS consists of a plan to deal with the following types of security for Mali: 
economic, internal, human, environment, information and so forth. 
55 U.S. Department of Defense, 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2012). 
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Strategy  Date Purpose 
2011 to protect and defend the nation and its allies.
56
 
   
QDR MAR 
2014 
The QDR is a legislatively-mandated review of DOD long-
term strategy and priorities. It assesses challenges and re-









This statement reveals AFRICOM’s posture to address 
increasing U.S. interests, transnational threats, and crises.
58
  
   
JSOTF-TS 2014 JSOTF-TS Supports partner nations and conducts special 




3. Strategy and Strategy: A More Indirect Approach  
In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way there; a direct 
approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by 
compression, whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender’s hold by 
upsetting his balance.60 
The cascading effects of U.S. interests and objectives flow from policy to military 
strategy. However, according to current policy and strategic documents, the VEOs and 
violent NSAs in Northern Mali do not pose an immediate threat to U.S. interests. It 
appears that decision makers are concerned only with VEOs that are affiliated with the al-
Qaida franchise. In fact, strategic assessments appear to evaluate VEOs and violent NSAs 
as merely leveraging the al-Qaida brand to promote their limited, regional causes and not 
the greater global jihad that al-Qaida wages as the vanguard VEO. However, the NSS and 
                                                 
56 U.S. Department of Defense, 2011 National Military Strategy (Arlington, VA: Department of 
Defense, 2011).  
57U.S. Department of Defense, “2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” Department of Defense, 
accessed April 01, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0314_sdr/qdr.aspx. 
58 In addition to the posture statement, the analyst would need to analyze the TCP 7000–12 (or Theater 
Campaign Plan with its associated Base Plan and Annexes). 2014 U.S. Africa Command Posture Statement: 
Statement of General David Rodriguez before Senate Armed Services Committee 113th Cong (2014) 
(testimony of David Rodriguez).   
59 Joint Special Operations Task Force—Trans Sahara, “JSOTF–TS Mission,” Joint Special 
Operations Task Force—Trans Sahara, accessed May 05, 2014 
http://www.socafrica.africom.mil/component/JSOTF–TS.asp. 
60 Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach.  
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QDDR are not up-to-date policy documents reflecting the realities of the conflicts in 
Northern Mali, or North Africa, for that matter. Therefore, the AFRICOM commander 
must continue to ensure that his subordinate commanders are constantly adapting their 
regional strategies per the S-AF, the S-NEA, and various U.S. embassies across the 
continent.61 Otherwise, VEOs and violent NSAs will continue to exploit DOD–DOS 
communication gaps.  
Still, VEOs and violent NSAs have the potential to become greater threats to U.S. 
interests. The 2012 coup d’état in Mali proved that VEOs and violent NSAs could 
destabilize Northern Mali. As VEOs conduct kidnap-for-ransom operations to fund 
terrorist activities, smuggle drugs to finance operations in Europe, conduct arms 
trafficking, impose Sharia law, and promulgate other nefarious activities, U.S. 
policymakers must update their directives so that military decision makers can adjust 
strategy accordingly. Otherwise, the military will continue to pursue the direct approach 
by conducting or supporting CT operations and reactively chasing obsolete fixes that fail 
(see appendices A, B, and H).  
While falling in line with other combatant-command efforts in post-9/11 conflicts, 
AFRICOM has also pursued General John Abizaid’s notion of the “long war” strategy.62 
For example, AFRICOM sought to achieve policy directives through the annual Flintlock 
exercises in the trans-Sahara. Flintlock involved regional state-actor militaries in 
conducting CT-related exercises to maintain African partnerships and security 
apparatuses, in an effort to deal with VEOs and violent NSAs. AFRICOM executed other 
CT programs through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) as well. 
Yet despite the short-term successes of the direct approach, the problem set remains 
wicked. From 2012 to 2014, the U.S. has nevertheless been supporting French–Malian 
CT operations in Northern Mali (see Appendix L). 
                                                 
61 DoDD 5205.75 states that DOD personnel in a foreign country who are not under the command of a 
U.S. geographic combatant commander (GCC) will be under the authority of the chief of mission (COM) in 
that country. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5205.75: DOD Operations at 
U.S. Embassies (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2013), 2. 
62 Bradley Graham and Josh White, “Abizaid Credited with Popularizing the Term ‘Long War,’” 
Washington Post 3 (2006), A08. 
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Under the circumstances, strategists and decision analysts should contemplate 
what policy has to say about the indirect approach. U.S. decision makers agree on 
structural aspects of improving African-partner capacity, security apparatuses, and 
governance; however, military decision makers should adapt their current strategy to 
complement civilian power, other soft-power initiatives, and indirect approaches across 
the DIMEFIL domains.63 More pointedly, AFRICOM should alter its strategy to better 
accommodate the sustainable-development strategy promoted by the S-AF and S-NEA. 
Military strategies supporting an indirect approach would likely dissuade the DOS from 
spoiling AFRICOM efforts in Northern Mali, the trans-Sahara, and the rest of Africa. 
AFRICOM must do all it can to promote consensus building among ambassadors, DOS 
decision makers, and other civilian leaders in a way that proves that conflicts will not 
metastasize. The criticisms of the DOS by the Association of Concerned African Scholars 
(ACAS), for example, who claimed that the TSCTP was militarizing U.S. policies,64 
might thus have been avoided. 
The ACAS’s anxiety likely stemmed from AFRICOM’s failure to incorporate a 
supporting strategy for soft-power initiatives and activities wielded by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and other diplomatic agencies. Bearing this in 
mind, AFRICOM must devise mission directives that convincingly de-escalate problems 
and remain unassuming. Operations and activities conducted by the USAID, non-
government organizations (NGOs), various international organizations, private 
organizations, and so forth rely on a do-no-harm image of neutrality and objectivity. In 
that vein of sustainable development, AFRICOM must adapt to the DOS’s fundamental 
school of thought to succeed in promoting American interests in Northern Mali. 
                                                 
63 Analysts should view the indirect approach in the way that Szafranski argues that military power 
resides in the domain of the mind and the will; the provinces of choice, “thinking,” valuing or “attitude,” 
and insight or “imagination.” The indirect approach should resemble what Szafranski refers to as 
neocortical warfare, which “…strives to control or shape the behavior of enemy organisms, but without 
destroying the organisms. It does this by influencing, even to the point of regulating, the consciousness, 
perceptions and will of the adversary’s leadership: the enemy’s neocortical system.” Richard Szafranski, 
“Neo-Cortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill,” Military Review (1994), 41–55. 
64 Arieff, Crisis in Mali, 15–16. 
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By considering how to complement the DOS’s approach to sustainable 
development, AFRICOM can truly fulfill the president’s NSS, which seeks a whole-of-
government approach.65 More importantly, the strategy will be more congruent with the 
ever-changing operational environment. Just as the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Act calls on 
the interagency to collaborate,66 military strategies must relate to policy. Beyond the 
benefits of eliminating redundancies and wasted efforts, the interagency can work more 
cohesively toward defeating VEOs in Northern Mali.  
With a more synergistic military strategy, AFRICOM can influence wicked 
problems by intervening in the causal factors of terrorism. Until the president and DOS 
alter policy in the Malian region, however, AFRICOM would do well to follow the four 
key themes of the QDDR:67 
1. Build U.S. civilian power, bringing together the unique contributions of 
civilians across the federal government to advance U.S. interests. 
2. Elevate and transform development to deliver results by focusing our 
investments, supporting innovation, and measuring results. 
3. Build a civilian capacity to prevent and respond to crisis and conflict and 
give our military the partner it needs and deserves. 
4. Change the way we do business by working smarter to save money, 
planning and budgeting to accomplish our priorities, and measuring the 
results of our investments. 
Additionally, all six of AFRICOM’s functionally aligned directorates must synchronize 
their strategies and nest them with the DOS, as depicted in Figure 5. 
                                                 
65 U.S. Department of Defense, 2011 National Military Strategy, 6. 
66 Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99–433 
(1986). President Ronald Reagan signed the Goldwater–Nichols Act, which attempted to make sweeping 
changes throughout the DOD to solve problems caused by inter-service rivalry. Following the failures of 
the Vietnam War, and 1980 Iranian hostage rescue, the Congress passed the new bill. 
67 U.S. Department of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy & Development Review: A Summary 




Figure 5.  The Six Functionally Aligned Directorates of AFRICOM68 
B. THE DANGERS OF NOT COORDINATING STRATEGY AND POLICY 
By focusing on DIMEFIL’s soft powers (in the diplomatic, information, and 
economic domains), the interagency community can collectively leverage its unique 
contributions to advance U.S. interests. To succeed in this indirect approach, AFRICOM 
must reprioritize its missions to support development, refocus investments, promote 
innovation, and measure results. A military strategy that supports the notion of building 
civilian power and capacity to prevent or respond to crises allows the DOS to collaborate 
with AFRICOM. By changing the way AFRICOM does business, the interagency and the 
elements of national power will deal more intensely with the following factors: 
1. Fiscal limitations and realities  
2. Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution to achieve U.S. 
priorities 
3. Evaluating the results of its investments 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate DOS, USAID, and DOD relationships and funding in 
Africa.69 
                                                 
68 U.S. Africa Command, USAFRICOM Directorate for Logistics—J4: Engineer Division—J44. 








Figure 7.  DOS and USAID Funding for TSCTP
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The wicked problems in Northern Mali will likely persist so long as DOD and 
DOS decision makers do not collaborate more effectively (see Appendices A, B, and C 
for a detailed explanation). Wicked problems derive “…from the interdependencies and 
complexities of living together without a shared set of values and views.”70 Ultimately, 
the literature suggests that AFRICOM should work with its partners to develop effective 
coping strategies that are collaborative in nature. The more U.S. decision makers 
collaborate, the better they can work toward sustainable development in Northern Mali, 






                                                 
70 Roberts, Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution, 1–19, 16. 
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V. PART III–THE DECISION-SUPPORT PROCESS:  
A QUANTITATIVE REVIEW 
This chapter presents Step III in the decision-support process: integer 
programming (IP) to model the problem. 
A. STEP III–CHOOSE: INTEGER PROGRAMMING 
Real-world scenarios are not always linear; however, decision analysts can help 
simplify wicked problems with decision models such as the binary-integer-programming 
(BIP) approach proposed in this thesis. Proper BIP modeling can help analysts make 
resource-allocation decisions so as to target VEOs and violent NSAs. To effectively 
allocate resources, this research investigates one way that analysts formulate, solve, and 
interpret a problem. The formulation step involves the process of expressing and 
translating each aspect of the wicked problem in terms of simple mathematical 
expressions.71 Throughout formulation, the analyst ensures that the mathematical 
equations employed address issues relevant to Northern Mali. Regarding the development 
of a solution, analysts must ensure that these mathematical expressions determine values 
for variables and identify an optimal solution. With proper formulation and the selection 
of an optimal solution, the analyst can interpret the BIP model and assess the impact of 
the decision. 
Decision analysts often encounter problems in which there are two or more 
objective functions that need to be optimized simultaneously. This research, however, 
uses BIP models to develop only one set of optimization objectives. In this case, the 
analyst optimally allocates sustainable-development projects to 24 communes while 
maximizing the total amount of rehabilitation. Ultimately, leaders have simple binary-
integer solutions, denoted by “yes” or “no” (1 or 0, respectively) to help with the 
decision-making process. This section outlines the framework for developing the BIP 
model by briefly presenting popular LP problems: set covering, transportation, and 
assignment. 
                                                 
71 Balakrishnan, Render, and Stair, Managerial Decision Modeling with Spreadsheets, 21. 
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B. THE SET-COVERING PROBLEM 
The key principle of LP is that interactions exist among variables. In the case of 
Northern Mali, adjacency constraints limit the degree to which the government can build 
sustainable-development projects. The BIP model leverages these adjacency constraints, 
which forces the projects to support more than one commune at a time. In other words, 
the constraints allow a decision analyst to limit the redundancy of sustainable-
development projects by identifying optimal project sites that serve multiple neighboring 
communes. Analysts commonly refer to this application of BIP modeling as “set 
covering.” In this particular study, set covering allows the analyst to optimally cover key 
areas throughout Northern Mali.72 
The decision analyst designs the set-covering constraint under the assumption that 
a single project can serve or influence neighboring or adjacent communes. By ensuring 
that at least one project covers multiple communes, the analyst gives decision makers a 
starting point from which to begin negotiations. If necessary, the analyst can add a 
constraint that avoids incompatible selections or mutually exclusive choices;73 for 
example, the analyst could add the constraint of disallowing more than one project to 
serve a commune. Similarly, the decision maker could dictate that an exact quantity of 
projects covers each commune. Ultimately, the set-covering constraint allows a project to 
cover multiple communes. 
C. THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 
Models involving transportation problems involve the distribution of goods and 
services from multiple supply points (also called origins or sources) to multiple demand 
points (also called destinations or sinks), at some cost.74 This application maximizes the 
profits or minimizes the cost of shipping goods between locations while meeting the 
needs and capacity of each arrival point. Although decision analysts can solve 
transportation problems with algorithms more economical than the simplex method, this 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 220. 
73 Ibid., 222. 
74 Ibid., 162. 
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thesis tames the complexity of the problem set by reducing thousands of variables and 
constraints to a few hundred. As analysts contemplate whether the problem they are 
tackling is similar to a transportation problem, they should recall a special type of 
transportation problem: the “assignment problem.” 
D. THE ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM 
The assignment problem is a subclass of the transportation problem, in which the 
supply-and-demand variables are integral. Assignment models can involve choosing 
optimal, one-to-one assignments of soldiers to bases, military units to territories, 
contracts to bidders, and so forth.75 As decision analysts seek to find an optimal 
assignment of soldiers or units to unique mission sets—without assigning a soldier or unit 
to more than one mission—they must ensure that all missions are completed. Ultimately, 
the analyst chooses to minimize or maximize some objective. Unlike the transportation 
problem, the assignment problem has more wide-ranging uses in applying combinatorial 
optimization to the real world. In this study, analysts can use it to assign sustainable-
development projects to particular regions. 
1. Assignment Example: Palmer and Innes (1980) 
Palmer and Innes offer many examples in operational research, and in particular, 
the authors present several simple assignment problems that support the model-
development process in this thesis.76 An example is a problem where analysts learn the 
difference between the assignment technique and the transportation method described in 
the previous sections by considering a firm trying to determine where to build or allocate 
five warehouses, with six possible sites available. The driving factor is the cost of 
building the warehouses at the different locations, so the firm must learn the total 
minimum cost of building five warehouses and where to build them. In another instance, 
five doctors who just started a private practice want to provide services to five areas. The  
 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
76 Colin F. Palmer and Alexander E. Innes, Operational Research by Example (London, UK: 
Macmillan, 1980).  
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goal in the problem is to minimize the distance they have to travel to each area. The 
questions and principals behind these simple examples are foundational to the approach 
used in this research. 
2. Assignment Example: Koopmans and Beckmann (1957)  
Quadratic-assignment problems (QAPs) are among the most complex 
combinatorial optimization problems. Scores of academics, authors, and other 
professionals have expanded on QAP methodology, because of its richness in solving 
real-world applications. Padberg and Manfred build on Koopmans and Beckmann’s work 
on QAP,77 producing what they refer to as the KBP. KBP methodology explores the 
problem of assigning indivisible economic activities to locations. KBP or QAP 
methodology allows the modeler to assign n plants to n locations, while ensuring that the 
interaction cost is proportional to the flow between the plants, multiplied by the distances 
between the locations. The modeler must also account for the costs of placing the plants 
at their locations. Ultimately, the QAP’s objective is to allocate each plant to some 
location while minimizing total cost. Padberg and Manfred elaborate on the KBP model 
by applying the location/assignment problem in the U.S and comparing three 
modifications of the KBP: the changed, modified, and symmetric versions.  
 
                                                 
77 Manfred Padberg and Minendra P. Rijal, Location, Scheduling, Design and Integer Programming, 
Vol. 19 (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic, 1996), 14–20; Tjalling C. Koopmans and Martin Beckmann, 
“Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities,” Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society (1957): 53–76, 64–71. 
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VI. PART IV–THE DECISION-SUPPORT PROCESS: IP 
MODELING 
This chapter focuses on Step IV-A (formulate) of the decision-support process to 
determine solutions to regain control of Northern Mali: define the problem, develop a 
model, and acquire the data. 
A. MODEL, MATERIALS, AND METHOD 
Model I–Set Covering and Model II–Realm of Influence are covered in the 
following sections: 
1. Model Description 
2. Model Development 
3. Materials 
4. Methodology  
Figure 8 illustrates the Step IV-A of the decision-support process. 
 
Figure 8.  Step IV-A: Formulate 
B. MODEL I–SET COVERING: MODEL DESCRIPTION 
This section describes the use of deterministic, mathematical programming to 
optimally assign a limited number of sustainable-development projects, by type, across 
Northern Mali. By “optimally” is meant the best possible allocation of projects, all other 
things being equal, to achieve maximal rehabilitation throughout the region. In other 
words, the model weighs varying levels of desert degradation while allocating projects to 
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achieve the greatest rehabilitation possible. It must be noted that, due to limited 
resources, the supply of projects will not meet the demands of key stakeholders and 
decision makers. 
Since decision analysts will not be able to assign every commune an ideal project, 
they must assign projects optimally, based on rehabilitation scores. First, analysts 
determine each commune’s quality score by developing a mathematical function to 
account for eight quality factors and measuring the degree of sustainable development 
needed. Then the analyst determines the value of sustainable development projects. In 
this scenario, there are four types of projects (or four project designs) of which the model 
assigns to communes. The rehabilitation scores depend upon how the model matches 
projects to communes. The model uses the equation below to determine rehabilitation 
scores (see Equation 3). 
   
( )
and   1,..., 47 ,  1,2,3,4
(sets and indices are defined below)
ij j iQ P C
i j
  
   
The objective function, subject to multiple constraints, allows the analyst to 
compare the rehabilitation scores and match projects and communes optimally to achieve 




    







Developing a model in this fashion gives the analyst a starting point from which decision 
makers can begin negotiations, consensus building, model refinement, and collection of 
more accurate, classified data. 
1. Objective of the Model 
The objective of the decision model is to offer decision makers a starting place for 
developing options to combat or reverse desertification in Northern Mali. By optimally 
distributing a limited number of sustainable-development projects across the region, 
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decision makers can hope to develop fair options that are agreeable to the majority of key 
stakeholders. Therefore, the objective function is subject to decision-maker preferences 
(demand constraints), “brute” constraints to address high-threat communes (demand 
constraints), constraints based on the availability of projects (supply constraints), set-
covering constraints to cover neighboring communes, and binary constraints. To clearly 
inform decision makers, the model’s decision variables are in the form of binary variables 
that indicate the assignment of a project to a commune. Analysts should apply the 
objective of the model to the following problem statement: 
The DOD, DOS, interagency organizations, coalitional partners, and other 
international organizations (hereafter referred to as the CJTF, or combined joint task 
force) have decided to intervene in the Sahel problem set with sustainable development. 
Specifically, decision makers have determined that the CJTF should intervene by 
implementing sustainable development to deter, displace, or defeat VEOs and violent 
NSAs. The goal is to regain control of Northern Mali. To optimally implement 
sustainable development, decision analysts must achieve the maximum rehabilitation 
possible, subject to numerous constraints. First, sustainable-development projects must 
influence key towns and cities assessed as a high-threat commune. Second, as the model 
determines where to allocate projects, it should also consider how projects are connected 
to each other, to gain optimal coverage in the region. For example, a single project may 
serve multiple communes. 
In addition to rehabilitating desertified lands, the optimal allocation of projects 
will assist the government in regaining a proportion of control over the political space 
and some level of government compliance from the indigenous population. The analyst 
must determine which of the 47 communes should receive the sustainable-development 
projects. However, the analyst has a limited inventory of 24 projects. Furthermore, the 
analyst categorizes the projects into the following four project types: 
1. Project Design 1 has a supply of six projects, with a quality score of 7. 
2. Project Design 2 has a supply of eight projects, with a quality score of 8 
3. Project Design 3 has a supply of seven projects, with a quality score of 9 
4. Project Design 4 has a supply of three projects, with a quality score of 10 
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The open-source media reporting (see Chapter VI, Section D) suggest that the 
following eight communes are “high threat” (or VEO-controlled areas with violence or 
threat to human life) and must therefore receive a project: Aguelhok, Ansongo, Gao, 
Kidal, Menaka, Tessalit, Tombouctou, and Tinzouaten. Finally, decision makers 
hypothetically dictate that analysts strategically situate projects to target VEOs and 
violent NSAs directly or indirectly, or both. See Figure 9 for the layout of 47 communes 
in Northern Mali. 
  
Figure 9.  Northern Mali: Communes i, in the Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou 
Regions  
2. Model Development 
a. Parameters of Model I 
There are five main sets: 
 set of all communes;
set of all project designs;
 set of commune quality scores;
'  = set of all communes  that surround commune ';  and












Model I assigns the following indices to communes, projects, and quality scores: 
, '  communes;
 project designs; and








Let iC  be the sum of the set of quality scores for each commune i (see Appendix 
D, Section I); where 
 











   (1) 
Let 
jP  be the quality score for each project j; where 



















For projects denoted as 1P , 6 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 2P , 8 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 3P , seven projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 4P , three projects are available. 
In all, there are a total of 24 projects available.  
Let Qij be the rehabilitation score, which is the difference between the quality 
scores for project j and commune i.  
    
( )
and   1,..., 47 ,  1,2,3,4
ij j iQ P C
i j
  
   (3) 
Table 5 illustrates the rehabilitation scores for each project–commune 
combination. Therefore, the model uses the following 188 pre-defined sets (coefficients). 
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Table 5.   Rehabilitation Scores Qij 
  
Equation 3 allows the analyst to calculate the rehabilitation scores Qij, which are 
found in Table 5. When AFRICOM assigns a project j to commune i, the commune 
rehabilitates up to the quality score of project j. For example, in the top-left corner of the 
table, the analyst makes the following calculation (see Appendix F, Section I): 
11 1 1 11( )   (7.00 6.75) 0.25Q P C Q        
c. Decision Variables 
The optimization model uses  ijx for its decision variables. 
Let xij be the binary decision variable, 
 
   
1    if project  is assigned to commune  
where  
0   otherwise













d. Objective Function 








  (5) 
e. Constraints 
Equation 6 is a set-covering constraint ensuring that each commune i is served by 







   (6) 
For example, when the set-covering constraint is applied to commune 1, it reads as 
follows (see Appendix F for all 47 set covering constraints): 
1 2 32 34 46
Covering,  1 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j
commune
x x x x x    
 
Equations 7 to 10 are supply constraints, ensuring that every project j is assigned 




















  (10) 
For example, when the supply constraint is applied to project design 1, it reads as follows 
(see Appendix F for the details of all four supply constraints):  
11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 111 121 131
141 151 161 171 181 191 201 211 221 231 241 251
261 271 281 291 301 311 321 3
Supply of project 1,  of which 6 are availablej
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x

            
           
       31 341 351 361 371
381 391 401 411 421 431 441 451 461 471
6
x x x x




     




Equation 11 is the demand constraint ensuring that every commune i receives at 





  (11) 
For example, when the demand constraint is applied to commune 1, it reads as follows 
(see Appendix F for the details of all 47 demand constraints):  
11 12 13 14Demand from  1 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     
Equation 12 is a simple demand constraint that assigns at least one project j to 








For example, when the brute constraint (or HTC) is applied to Commune 7, it reads as 









Equation 13 is a binary constraint, which forces the analyst to select or reject (1 or 
0) the assignment of a project j to a commune i. 
 1 or 0,ijx ij   (13) 
3. Limitations 
The first limitation deals with the objective function maximizing the allocation of 
projects to the various communes, based on rehabilitation scores. In this scenario, the 
decision analyst can assign only one project to each commune to achieve the best 
possible rehabilitation score, Qij. Also the model’s 108 constraints limit the model, 
because they allow for mutually exclusive alternatives and contingent decisions. Another 
limitation is the model’s representation of a yes-or-no decision model, rather than a 
decision that determines how much. 
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C. MODEL II–REALM OF INFLUENCE: MODEL DESCRIPTION 
Like Model I, this section describes the use of deterministic, mathematical 
programming (i.e., BIP modeling) to optimally assign a limited amount of sustainable-
development projects, by type, across Northern Mali. However, Model II calculates 
commune quality scores, 'ic , differently. While optimally allocating projects to achieve 
the greatest rehabilitation, the model weights a commune’s quality score.  
Due to the lack of adherence to external and internal borders in Northern Mali, 
analysts may develop a second model with quality scores 'ic  that are distributed by some 
proportionality to bordering communes. In other words, the model seeks to determine the 
realm of influence each commune has vis-à-vis another. The analyst accomplishes this 
concept by modifying Equation 1 from Model I. The new equation to determine 'ic  (i.e., 
Equation 14) weights the sustainable-development factors 'qi  in the following fashion:
78 
1. It sums quality factors 'qi  and weights them such that each commune 
receives 50 percent of its total sum. 
2. Then it distributes the remaining 50 percent of the score for 'ic  to the 
communes that surround or share a border with 'ic . 
3. In effect, this indicates that a commune’s quality score will contribute to 
the quality scores of surrounding communes and vice versa. 
Still, decision analysts will not be able to assign every commune an ideal project. 
However, Equation 114 accounts for the relationships shared by neighboring communes 
across the eight sustainable development factors, 'qi . In other words, the new equation 
for 'ic  
tries to account for NSAs not recognizing the internal borders that France 
established in the early twentieth century.  
Still, Model II optimally assigns projects based on rehabilitation scores 'ijQ . 
Analysts determine each commune’s quality score, 'ic , by developing a mathematical 
function to account for the eight weighted quality factors of a commune 'qi  to measure 
                                                 
78 Analysts should adjust Equation 14 immediately following site surveys, due to possible concerns 
regarding independence of observations. 
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the degree of sustainable development needed (see Equation 14) Depending on the 
allocation of projects ' jP , the analysts can determine rehabilitation scores 'ijQ . The 
objective function, subject to multiple constraints, allows the analyst to optimally allocate 
projects to achieve a total maximum amount of rehabilitation. 
1. Objective of the Model 
Analysts optimally allocate projects while accounting for the eight weighted 'ij  
factors to derive the communes’ scores 'ic . Otherwise, the objective function presented in 
Model I matches Model II (Equation 18). Except for the covering constraints described in 
Model I, Equation 18 is still subject to the same constraints. The decision variables for 
Model II are still in the form of binary variables to indicate the assignment of a project j 
to a commune i. The problem statement and goal remain the same as Model I (that is, 
regain control of Northern Mali). 
2. Model Development 
a. Parameters of Model I 
There are six main sets: 
 
b. Indices 
Model I assigns the following indices to communes, projects, and quality scores: 
, '  communes;
 communes  that surround commune ';
 project designs; and










'  set of all communes;
 set of all communes that surround C'
' set of all project designs;
'  set of commune quality scores;
'  = set of all communes  that surround commune '; and











ll high threat communes.
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Let 'iC  be the sum of the set of quality scores for each commune i, where 
 
1























Let ' jP  be the quality score for each project j, where 



















For projects denoted as 1'P , 6 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 2'P , 8 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 3'P , 7 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 4'P , 3 projects are available. 
In all, there is a total of 24 projects available.  
Let Q’ij be the rehabilitation score, which is the difference between the quality 
scores for project j and commune i. 
 
   
' ( ' ' )
and   1,..., 47 ,  1,2,3,4





Table 6 illustrates the rehabilitation scores for each project–commune 
combination. Therefore, the model uses the following 188 pre-defined sets (coefficients).
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Table 6.   Rehabilitation Scores  'ijQ  
  
Equation 16 allows the analyst to calculate the rehabilitation scores Q’ij, which are 
located in Table 6. When AFRICOM assigns a project j to commune i, the commune 
rehabilitates up to the quality score of project j. For example, in the top-left corner of the 
table, the analyst would make the following calculation (see Appendix D, Section I):  
11 1 1 11' ( ' ' )   ' (7.00 5.18) 1.82Q P C Q        
c. Decision Variables 
The optimization model uses  'ijx for its decision variables. 
Let x’ij be the binary decision variable, 
 
   
1    if project '  is assigned to commune  
where  '
0   otherwise













d. Objective Function 








  (18) 
e. Constraints 
Equation 19 is a covering constraint ensuring that each commune i is served by at 







   (19) 
For example, when the set-covering constraint is applied to commune 1, it reads as 
follows (see Appendix H for all 47 set-covering constraints):  
1 2 32 34 46
Covering,  1 is served by a project(s)
( ' ' ' ' ' ) 1j j j j j
commune
x x x x x    
 
Equations 20 to 23 are supply constraints ensuring that every project j is assigned 




















  (23) 
For example, when the supply constraint is applied to project design 1, it reads as follows 
(see Appendix H for the details of all four supply constraints): 
 
11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 111 121 131
141 151 161 171 181 191 201 211 221 231 241 251
261 271
Supply of project 1,  of which 6 are available
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' '
j
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x

            
           
  281 291 301 311 321 331 341 351 361 371
381 391 401 411 421 431 441 451 461 471
6
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
x x x x x x x x x x




          




Equation 24 is the demand constraint ensuring that every commune i receives at 





  (24) 
For example, when the demand constraint is applied to Commune 1, it reads as follows 
(see Appendix H for the details of all 47 demand constraints):  
11 12 13 14Demand from  1 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     
Equation 25 is a brute demand constraint that assigns at least one project j to each 
of the following high-threat communes (HTC): 7, 9, 10, 15, 17, 20, 24, and 32. 




    (25) 
For example, when the brute constraint (or HTC) is applied to commune 7, it 









Equation 26 is a binary constraint, which forces the analyst to select or reject (1 or 
0) the assignment of a project j to a commune i. 
 ' 1 or 0,ijx ij   (26) 
3. Limitations 
Like Model I, the first limitation deals with the objective function, maximizing 
the allocation of projects to communes i based on rehabilitation scores and subject to 
multiple constraints (Equations to 19 to 26). Although Model II is a slight modification of 
Model I, Model II has the following distinctions: 
1. The communes’ quality score ic in Equation 1 changed to 'ic , which 
attempts to indicate the interrelatedness (or realm of influence) with the 
neighboring communes’ eight sustainable-development factors 'qi . 
2. Model II does not include the covering constraints from Model I.  




The input data originated from multiple sources of unclassified websites—the 
World Bank Group, City Population, online media websites, and other online sources that 
provided unclassified maps of the threat situation. The World Bank Group’s data are 
current as of May 2014.79 City Population compiled its data, as of 2009, from the United 
Nations World Population and Housing Census Program.80 The data from both 
organizations’ websites cover all 87 of the communes (or municipalities, which are the 
lowest tier of the administrative hierarchy) located in the regions of Tombouctou, Kidal, 
and Gao in Northern Mali. However, to simplify the problem set, the decision analyst 
may opt to combine groups of small communes into a single site to create a more 
manageable site bank. For this scenario, the analyst assumes a total of 47 project sites, 
which are still referred to as communes. 
For Model I, analysts use the following criteria for ic  (see Appendix D): 
 1 0,1i   population density 
 2 0,1i   existing bodies of water 
 3 0,1i   flood frequency 
 4 0,1i   drought mortality risk 
 5 0,1i  cropland intensity 
 6 0,1i   illicit routes 
 7 0,1i   violent NSA-controlled territory 
 8 0,1i   significant activities (SIGACTS) 
For Model II, analysts use the following criteria for 'ic : 
 1' 0,1i   population density 
                                                 
79 The World Bank Group, World Bank Climate Variability Tool. 
80 City Population, “Population Statistics for Countries.” 
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 2' 0,1i   existing bodies of water 
 3' 0,1i   flood frequency 
 4' 0,1i   drought mortality risk 
 5' 0,1i   cropland intensity 
 6' 0,1i   illicit routes 
 7' 0,1i  violent NSA-controlled territory 
 8' 0,1i   significant activities (SIGACTS) 
E. METHOD 
For Model I, there are 188 decision variables and 108 constraints used to allocate 
projects and determine rehabilitation scores, exceeding the computing capabilities of 
Microsoft Excel’s basic Solver add-in, which allows the user to apply 200 decision 
variables and 100 constraints (see Appendix H). Therefore, Model I requires an upgrade 
to an advanced solver engine. For Model II, there are 188 decision variables and 61 
constraints used to allocate projects and determine rehabilitation scores, which do not 
exceed Solver’s computing capabilities. For both models, this research used Frontline 
Systems’ Risk-Solver Platform (RSP), a solver add-in that interfaces with Excel and uses 
a variety of built-in solver engines.81 The RSP add-in enhances the analyst’s ability to 
handle significantly more decision variables and constraints, as detailed in Appendix H.82 
                                                 
81 Frontline Systems, “Frontline Solvers Built-in Solver Engines,” Frontline Systems, accessed May 
15, 2014, http://www.solver.com/files/_document/Built–in–Solver–Engine–Comparison–Chart.pdf. This 
scenario uses the Large–Scale LP/QP Solver Engine to calculate more complex problems. 




VII. RESULTS, ANALYSIS, AND SYNTHESIS 
This chapter presents Step IV-B (solve) and Step IV-C (interpret) in the decision-
support process: developing and testing solutions, analyzing results, implementing 
results, and updating. In addition, this chapter seeks to answer the primary research 
questions, while addressing the following subordinate questions: 
1. Do sustainable-development projects increase the compliance of NSAs 
and eventual displacement of VEOs? 
2. What are the benefits of investing in development to support theater 
campaign plans, economic development, and indigenous security forces? 
3. How can sustainable development help build our capacity to strengthen 
African partner nations? 
Figure 10 highlights the importance of a feedback loop in the decision-support process. 
 
Figure 10.  Step IV: A Framework to Support Decision Makers 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents results and analyses for Model I and Model II and includes 
the diplomatic estimations proposed in Chapter IV. The diplomatic estimation evaluates 
the amount of control the Malian government may potentially regain by allocating 
projects optimally. Analysts indicate the amount of control by summing the total area of 
the communes i, which are assigned projects j, and divide them by the total area of the 
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region in which the communes are found.83 To clarify the notion of control, analysts may 
adapt the following definitions. Details of the project designs are in Appendix C.  
Project Design 1, the analyst assumes the following:  
1. Department of State (DOS)-led projects focus strongly on sustainable 
development; control is determined by the populace’s compliance with the 
government. 
2. The degree to which the government can maintain a permissive to 
uncertain environment is low,84 as is its ability to maintain a low VEO 
threat level. 
3. Zero to negligible use of external security/military forces (e.g., French and 
U.S.) is desired; instead, the indigenous security apparatus polices itself. 
For Project Design 2, the analyst assumes the following: 
1. DOS-led projects focus strongly on sustainable development; control is 
determined by the populace’s compliance with the government. 
2. The degree to which the government can maintain a permissive to 
uncertain environment is low, as is its ability to maintain a low VEO threat 
level. 
3. Minimal use of external security/military forces (e.g., French and U.S.) is 
desired; instead, the indigenous security apparatus polices itself. 
For Project Design 3, the analyst assumes the following: 
1. DOD- and DOS-led projects focus moderately on development. 
2. The hostility in the environment is uncertain; the VEO threat is moderate 
to high. 
3. Moderate use of external security or military forces (e.g., Economic 
Community of the West African States [ECOWAS]) is desirable. 
                                                 
83 Ibid. Mali consists of eight regions and the Bamako capital district. However, this thesis focuses on 
three regions. There are a total of 87 communes in Northern Mali; however, this thesis simplified the 
problem into 47 sites, which are still called communes. 
84 The level of permissiveness in a commune is determined by assessing the operational environment. 
According to JP 1-02, the operations environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and 
influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. 
A permissive environment suggests that the operational environment in which the host country military and 
law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends 
to conduct. An uncertain environment suggests that the operational environment in which host government 
forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally 
effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations. A hostile environment 
suggests that the operational environment in which hostile forces have control and the intent and capability 
to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. Joint Publication 1-02, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Arlington, VA: Department of 
Defense, 2014).     
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For Project Design 4, the analyst assumes the following: 
1. DOD-led projects focus moderately on development. 
2. The environment is hostile; VEO threat is high. 
3. Overt employment of security and military forces (e.g., Malian Defense 
Forces, ECOWAS, French, coalition support) is desirable. 
B. MODEL I: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Table 7 illustrates the allocation of projects j, the rehabilitation scores Qij by 
region, increases in rehabilitation, and the amount of control regained. 
Table 7.   Model I: Allocation of Sustainable-Development Projects 
 
In the Gao region, the total rehabilitation score increased by 96.9 percent (i.e., ci 
increased from 32.0 to 63.0), and the government potentially controls 71.7 percent of the 
political space. The model allocated seven projects as follows:85 
1. For Project Design 2, Gao received two projects. 
2. For Project Design 3, Gao received three projects. 
3. For Project Design 4, Gao received two projects. 
Kidal’s total rehabilitation score increased by 70.0 percent (i.e., ci increased from 
30.0 to 51.0). The focus was mostly DOS-sponsored projects. Therefore, the government 
potentially controls 65.7 percent of the political space. The model allocated six projects 
as follows: 
1. For Project Design 2, Kidal received three projects. 
2. For Project Design 3, Kidal received three projects. 
Tombouctou’s total rehabilitation score increased by 58.1 percent (i.e., ci 
increased from 53.8 to 85.1). The main focus was DOS-sponsored projects. Therefore, 
                                                 
85 The mix of DOD-led and DOS-led project designs was evenly distributed in terms of DOD and 
DOS sharing the lead. 
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the government potentially controls 60.2 percent of the political space. The model 
allocated 11 projects as follows: 
1. For Project Design 1, Tombouctou received six projects. 
2. For Project Design 2, Tombouctou received three projects. 
3. For Project Design 3, Tombouctou received one project. 
4. For Project Design 4, Tombouctou received one project, 
C. MODEL II: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Table 8 illustrates an allocation of projects j, rehabilitation scores Qij by region, 
increases in rehabilitation, and amount of control regained. 
Table 8.   Model II: Allocation of Sustainable-Development Projects 
 
Gao’s total rehabilitation score increased by 69.8 percent (i.e., ci increased from 
34.7 to 59.0). The mix of DOD- and DOS-led project designs was evenly distributed in 
terms of DOD and DOS taking the lead. Therefore, the government potentially controls 
73.8 percent of the political space. The model allocated seven projects as follows: 
1. For Project Design 2, Gao received four projects. 
2. For Project Design 3, Gao received three projects. 
Kidal’s total rehabilitation score increased by 54.4 percent (i.e., ci increased from 
35.6 to 55.0). The focus was DOS-sponsored projects. Therefore, the government 
potentially controls 55.6 percent of the political space. The model allocated seven 
projects as follows: 
1. For Project Design 1, Kidal received three projects. 
2. For Project Design 2, Kidal received two projects. 
3. For Project Design 3, Kidal received two projects. 
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Tombouctou’s total rehabilitation score increased by 77.9 percent (i.e., ci 
increased from 47.8 to 85.0). The mix of DOD- and DOS-led project designs was evenly 
distributed in terms of DOD and DOS taking the lead. Therefore, the government 
potentially controls 17.1 percent of the political space. The model allocated 10 projects as 
follows: 
1. For Project Design 1, Tombouctou received three projects. 
2. For Project Design 2, Tombouctou received two projects. 
3. For Project Design 3, Tombouctou received two projects.  
4. For Project Design 4, Tombouctou received three projects. 
D. SYNTHESIS 
Desertification is a silent, invisible crisis that is destabilizing communities 
on a global scale. As the effects of climate change undermine livelihoods, 
inter-ethnic clashes are breaking out within and across states and fragile 
states are turning to militarization to control the situation. The effects of 
desertification are increasingly felt globally as victims turn into refugees, 
internally displaced people and forced migrants or they turn to 
radicalization, extremism or resource-driven wars for survival. If we are to 
restore peace, security and international stability in a context where 
changing weather events are threatening the livelihoods of more and more 
people, survival options are declining and state capacities are 
overburdened, then more should be done to combat desertification, reverse 
land degradation and mitigate the effects of drought. Otherwise, many 
small-scale farmers and poor, land dependent communities face two 
choices: fight or flight.86 
The models allocated projects in a significantly different manner, but Model I and 
Model II produced similar rehabilitation scores (i.e., 83.3 vs. 80.9, respectively). 
Specifically, Model I was better at allocating and matching projects to communes based 
on threat level, degradation, and achieving maximal rehabilitation (see Figure 11). 
Ultimately, the set-covering constraints allowed Model I to effectively allocate projects 
and achieve greater rehabilitation. See Table 9 for a comparison of the models. 
Additionally, Model II misallocated Project Design 4 by assigning all three of 
them to the Tombouctou region. However, the Kidal and Gao regions had a greater need 
                                                 
86 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, “Desertification: The Invisible Frontline,” 1. 
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for Project Design 4. In the end, Model I allocated the projects while addressing the 
following supplemental research questions posed in chapters I and VII: 
1. Do sustainable-development projects increase the compliance of NSAs 
and eventual displacement of VEOs?  
2. What are the benefits of investing in development to support theater 
campaign plans, economic development, and indigenous security forces? 
3. How can sustainable development help build capacity to strengthen 
African partner nations? 
With the assignment of sustainable-development projects to key communes, the projects 
potentially facilitate the following: 
1. Creation of jobs for NSAs focused on development (e.g., agriculture, 
strategic oases, irrigated lands, livestock, and project security)  
2. Rehabilitation of rural areas to reestablish traditional nomadic lifestyles 
3. Improvement of infrastructure and basic services in rural areas 
4. Increase of collaboration between the DOS and DOD 
Table 9.   Model I Versus Model II 
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For Model I, the overall amount of control regained in Northern Mali is 65.7 
percent. In addition, the projects increase the communes’ level of land quality (i.e., 
reversed land degradation) by 71.9 percent. The advantages of COA I are its ability to 
rehabilitate communes and regain control throughout Northern Mali. As indicated by the 
red circles in Table 9, COA I appears to more optimal in terms of rehabilitation and 
control. As compared to Model II, the major advantage of Model I is the significant 
control regained in Tombouctou (60.2 percent in Model I versus 17.1 percent in Model 
II). See Figure 11 for a visual analysis. 
For Model II, the overall amount of control regained in Northern Mali is 45.5 
percent. Additionally, the projects increase the level of land quality by 68.5 percent. Like 
COA I, Model II provides coverage throughout Northern Mali. However, the overall 
amount of control regained in Tombouctou is 17.1 percent. 
Finally, as AFRICOM refines Model I,87 it should ensure the optimal solution 
nests with QDDR objectives before collaborating with the U.S. ambassador to Mali:88 
1. Build U.S. civilian power, bringing together the unique contributions of 
civilians across the federal government to advance U.S. interests. 
2. Elevate and transform development to deliver results by focusing our 
investments, supporting innovation, and measuring results. 
3. Build a civilian capacity to prevent and respond to crisis and conflict and 
give our military the partner it needs and deserves. 
4. Change the way we do business by working smarter to save money, 
planning and budgeting to accomplish our priorities, and measuring the 
results of our investments. 
 
                                                 
87 The refined model should include updated input data from negotiations, mediations, and consensus 
building meetings. Also, surveyors should increase the accuracy of the data to reflect the current levels of 
threat, land degradations, and so forth. Finally, the analysis should use the results from the sensitivity 
analyses to rerun Model I for better accuracy. 




Figure 11.  Visual Analysis: Model I Versus Model II
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E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: MODEL I SET COVERING 
Like any real-world scenario, the objective function coefficients (OFCs) carry 
uncertainty. Commune and project scores are not likely to be static or fixed. Therefore, 
the analyst should evaluate the sensitivity of the optimal solution from Model I by 
making reasonable changes to the OFC values and analyzing the effects. In the absence 
of accurate data, a simulation-based sensitivity analysis of the input variables should 
assist the decision analyst in maximizing rehabilitation and optimally allocating 
projects.89 The simulation forecasts the rehabilitation scores by comparing two extreme 
scenarios to one another (i.e., a maximum case vs. minimum case) and to a most-likely-
case scenario. In this setup, the Monte Carlo simulation ran five trials (one-thousand 
times per trial) for each project design.  
The simulation assumes three development scenarios that affect project scores 
(i.e., minimum, most likely, and maximum scores), which lower as the threat level 
increases.90 Due to the uncertainty surrounding the threat level in Northern Mali, each of 
these scenarios has an equal chance of happening (i.e., a uniform distribution—see 
Appendix E). Concurrently, the simulation addresses three commune scenarios 
(minimum, most likely, and maximum scores), which lower as the threat level increases. 
In this case, the simulation assumes a triangular distribution, as explained in Appendix E. 
The triangular distribution is a continuous probability distribution with minimum, 
maximum, and most-likely scores for projects and communes. Table 10 contains a 
summary of rehabilitation scores and illustrates different rehabilitation scores for 
minimum, most-likely, maximum, and average situations. 
                                                 
89 A sensitivity analysis allows the analyst to simulate the uncertainty in the output of the IP models. 
The analyst can simulate the apportionment of scores along different conditions of uncertainty. Therefore, 
the sensitivity analysis allows the analyst to test the robustness of the IP models’ outputs in the case of 
uncertainty. Furthermore, analysts can test the relationships between input variables and the output 
variables in the IP model. Commensurate with this thesis, analysts can clarify their interpretation of the IP 
models so that decision makers better understand the strength of the model as they collaborate with 
policymakers. This added level of analysis lends more credibility to the IP models, and it may give the 
AFRICOM commander more influence with the U.S. ambassador to Mali. 
90 The Monte Carlo method’s core idea is to use random samples of parameters or inputs to explore 
the behavior of a complex system or process. This Monte Carlo simulation was used to make forecasts due 
to uncertainty. Otherwise, the IP model could be significantly inaccurate with adverse effects. Frontline 




Table 10.   Sensitivity Analysis: Initial Setup of Input Variables 
No. Proj Proj Score Commune Score Rehab Score
max case 6 6.01 1.42 27.54
most likely case 5 6.50 1.67 24.15
min case 4 7.00 1.92 20.32
24.17
No. Proj Proj Score Commune Score Rehab Score
max case 8 7.01 2.47 36.32
most likely case 7 7.50 2.72 33.46
min case 6 8.00 2.97 30.18
33.49
No. Proj Proj Score Commune Score Rehab Score
max case 7 8.01 4.61 23.80
most likely case 6 8.50 4.86 21.84
min case 5 9.00 5.11 19.45
21.86
No. Proj Proj Score Commune Score Rehab Score
max case 3 9.01 5.75 9.78
most likely case 2 9.50 5.83 7.34
min case 1 10.00 6.00 4.00
7.29
Rehab Scores by Scenario 97.44 86.79 73.95 86.81
max case most likely case min case on avg





Monte Carlo Simulation Results for Project Desgin 1
Monte Carlo Simulation Results for Project Desgin 2
Monte Carlo Simulation Results for Project Desgin 3
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Table 10 illustrates the initial setup of the input variables evaluated in the 
simulation. The resultant rehabilitation scores shown in the table originate from the 
starting values for each scenario.91 Ultimately, the simulation suggests a total maximum 
rehabilitation score of 86.8 on average (see the outputs highlighted in the black ribbons). 
The minimum, most-likely, and maximum cases yielded the following scores: 97.4, 86.8, 
and 74.0, respectively. 
According to the simulation, to achieve a total maximum rehabilitation score of 
86.8 (the most-likely scenario), AFRICOM would allocate 20 projects in the following 
fashion: 
1. For Project Design 1, AFRICOM allocates five projects to achieve a 
rehabilitation score of 24.2. On average, the project and commune scores 
are approximately 6.50 and 1.67 respectively. 
2. For Project Design 2, AFRICOM allocates seven projects to achieve a 
rehabilitation score of 33.5. On average, the project and commune scores 
are approximately 7.50 and 2.72 respectively. 
3. For Project Design 3, AFRICOM allocates six projects to achieve a 
rehabilitation score of 21.9. On average, the project and commune scores 
are approximately 8.50 and 4.86 respectively. 
4. For Project Design 4, AFRICOM allocates two projects to achieve a 
rehabilitation score of 7.29. On average, the project and commune scores 
are approximately 8.50 and 5.83 respectively. 
The sensitivity analysis shows that Model I uses conservative values. For example, 
Model I assumes an allocation of 24 projects to achieve a total maximum rehabilitation 
score of 83.3. However, the simulation suggests that AFRICOM can achieve a higher 
rehabilitation score of 86.8 with only 20 projects. Ultimately, the analyst would need to 
take the findings from this sensitivity analysis and conduct another for the outputs for 
Model I—an endeavor beyond the scope of this thesis. 
                                                 
91 The simulation would randomly select the project number, project score, and commune score based 
on the aforementioned distributions (i.e., uniform and triangular distributions). However, Table 10 merely 
illustrates the initial setup of the simulation, and it shows the resultant outputs without simulation functions. 
For example, Risk Solver Platform uses the =PsiTriangular() function for the triangular distribution. 
Therefore, the simulator uses this function to draw a sample from a continuous distribution (e.g., for Project 
Design 1, project scores range 9.01 to 10.0 and commune scores range 5.75 to 6.00). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH  
A. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
AFRICOM, a relatively new organization, continues to face overwhelming 
DIMEFIL challenges in Northern Mali under the combined effects of the U.S. 
sequestration and continuing resolutions. Ultimately, AFRICOM must expand its 
alternatives by considering indirect approaches, such as sustainable development, to 
prevent further erosion of Mali’s ability to provide security, strong governance, economic 
growth, and regional stability. If not, VEOs and violent NSAs will continue to seize 
opportunities and spread their influence across the Sahel region. 
The ability to understand and penetrate the adversary’s decision cycles is vital. To 
deter, compel, or show restraint, the DOD, DOS, and interagencies must collaborate to 
determine optimal deterrence alternatives. Since violent NSAs are not inert pieces on a 
board game, decision analysts must make careful recommendations to prevent U.S. 
leaders from acting upon a misapprehension that they can exact decisive, direct influence 
over their adversary. 
Overall, the decision-support process described in this thesis leads to a 
recommended allocation of sustainable-development projects for regaining control of 
Northern Mali. The BIP models allocate projects to key locations to combat 
desertification and control ungoverned territories, and a solution that incorporates a 
mixture of four project designs for AFRICOM to pursue is identified. In the end, the 
decision maker has two COAs under which to allocate projects. However, the model is 
highly adaptable as indicated by the equations in Chapter VI. For example, the equations 
are written such that the analyst could further divide Mali into more or fewer communes. 
Also the analyst could add more project designs to address different needs, interests, and 
concerns of the indigenous populations of the Sahel.  
For COA I (or Model I), the overall amount of control regained is 65.7 percent of 
Northern Mali. Taken as a whole, COA I appears to be a better model in terms of 
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maximizing rehabilitation and control. For COA II (or Model II), the overall amount of 
control regained is 45.5 percent. However, Model II fails to control Tombouctou 
adequately (17.1 percent). 
Although only 24 of 47 communes received a project, the decision-support 
process suggests an indirect approach to target VEOs in ways that satisfy the U.S. 
ambassador and the AFRICOM commander without risk to human life or American 
interests. The author recommends that AFRICOM nest its strategy with the policies of the 
U.S. ambassador, S-AF and S-NEA and explore long-term, sustainable development to 
increase influence and achieve U.S. interests under a whole-of-government approach. 
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis proposes a decision-support process, using Northern Mali as a pilot 
case. Ideally, the entire trans-Sahara would be modeled to incorporate external factors 
such as the conflicts in Libya, Algeria, Niger, and Mauritania. As one example, the CT 
and security operations that Algeria had conducted for over a decade have caused al-
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to move to the ungoverned territories of the trans-
Sahara, where the regional security apparatus is weaker and VEO networks and 
infrastructure are robust. Thus, if other countries were included in the model, the optimal 
allocation of projects would increase significantly.92 Furthermore, this larger-scale model 
would operate under the assumption that the U.S. national-security system (the DOD, 
DOS, and other interagency elements) are fully cooperating and collaborating. 
In the near term, AFRICOM analysts should collect more accurate input data to 
enhance BIP models, which have the flexibility to take on more sustainable-development 
and threat factors. For example, after conducting site surveys, a decision analyst could 
add the sustainable development promoted by the United Nations (UN).93 The author 
recommends that analysts conduct more thorough sensitivity analysis of model inputs, 
                                                 
92 Effects-based targeting would be more effective as well. The DOS and DOD can collaborate to 
deter, displace, and defeat VEOs. If the Trans Saharan countries work together, they can purposefully 
displace VEOs in one location and destroy or defeat them in another location—by design. As VEOs retreat 
to their safe havens, and the African governments prove they can support the populace, they will likely gain 
more compliance form their citizens and regain control of the ungoverned or under governed territories. 
93 United Nations, 2012 FAO Statistical Yearbook: Chapter 4—Sustainability Dimensions.  
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processes, and outputs and work with the DOS and USAID to refine model constraints. 
By collaborating with interagency and international organizations, AFRICOM may 
enhance the accuracy of the models, and by working with the interagency to negotiate 
with key stakeholders, including leaders of indigenous populations and tribal groups, 
AFRICOM may gain more accurate data and private information.  
The author recommends that future models include budget constraints and cost–
benefit analysis—considering the financial aspects of sustainable development will make 
the model more realistic. Currently, a decision analyst might develop the model with an 
operating-budget range of $14 to $84 million.94 Adding realistic budgeting would 
provide more authority and persuasiveness to the AFRICOM commander as he 
collaborates with the embassy. 
Finally, future research should include rogue states and the support they give to 
violent NSAs and consider additional non-state-actors (e.g., intergovernmental 
organizations, private organizations, and NGOs) as having multiple competitors in the 
game better simulates real-world scenarios. In the end, decision analysts can only 
estimate the intentions of VEOs and violent NSAs in determining the critical variables 
and preferences that will eventually shape the operating environment. Adding these 
factors would make the exploration of other deterministic models or probabilistic models 
more complex and realistic. 
                                                 
94 The U.S. announced plans to provide approximately $84 million to support the African-led 
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) for the rest of fiscal year 2014. Recall in Chapter IV, the 
U.S. spent nearly $14 million in Mali to support TSCTP in 2007. So far in 2014, the U.S. has already 
committed over $12 million to provide basic logistical support to Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) forces. Also, decision analysts would take into account the representatives of the U.S.’s 
Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance (ACOTA) program are in West Africa working with 
troop contributing countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo) to conduct 
needs assessments and prepare for training. Mary Beth Leonard, “U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of 
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APPENDIX A. STEP I–FRAME: A WICKED PROBLEM 
In the age of networked intelligence, how prepared are policymakers and military 
commanders for dealing with conflicts as power shifts to individuals, networks, and 
coalitions in a multi-polar world?
95
 More importantly, how might analysts tackle wicked 
problems, which pose significant looming challenges to the U.S. national security 
system? In response to national security interests and defense priorities, analysts must 
consider the diffusion of power, dimension of morality, and social contextual issues in 
the Northern Mali conflict.  
To determine whether the case of Northern Mali is in wicked problem territory, 
this analysis explores the efficacy of the PMESII-PT analytic tool (i.e., assessing the 
following metrics: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, 
physical environment and time), which serves to supplement the design approach to 
discover feasible solutions and strategies. With this crucial distinction, decision analysts 
should be wary of making promises of solving, taming, or even coping with wicked 
problems. With existing tools of analysis, analysts gain an adequate handle on the vast 
array of problems and cascading effects over an indefinite period of time. Although 
conventional approaches have proven to solve complex problems, analysts must 
acknowledge that rational analytic methods alone insufficiently tackle wicked problems. 
Therefore, in the age of networked intelligence, analysts require innovative methods of 
problem solving to address the interdependencies associated with wicked problems. 
Ultimately, with collaborative networks, analysts can leverage an approach that ably 
identifies activities, applies innovation, exercises systems thinking, and enhances their 
efforts with information technologies to tackle wicked problems and collaborative 
strategies. 
                                                 
95 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC: 
National Intelligence Council, 2012). http://globaltrends2030.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/global–trends–
2030–november2012.pdf, ii. The author poses this question based on the findings in the GT–2030 report.  
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A. USING SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYTIC TOOLS 
To determine whether a conflict is in wicked problem territory, an activity map is 
a constructive tool to discover the degree at which problems, solutions, and stakeholders 
interact (see Figure 12). If the map illustrates uncertainty and a great degree of variance 
in a problem statement, decision analysts are approaching the realm of wicked problem 
territory. Consequently, with an undistinguished appraisal of the problem, the range of 
possible solutions is inexhaustible. To compound the situation, the constraints of the 
problem space relentlessly evolve throughout the domains of PMESII-PT. Due to the 
volatility created by many stakeholders, the limitations of the PMESII-PT domains are 
dynamic and beyond complexity.  Figure 12 illustrates the aforementioned activity map. 
 
Figure 12.  Activity Map: Wicked Problem Territory 
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B. THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN MALI 
In late March 2012, the following groups took Mali by storm: (1) National 
Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR), (2) Tuaregs,96 (3) 
Anṣār al Dīne, and (4) other Islamic jihadist movements. The militant wing of CNRDR 
launched a coup d’état in response to the Malian government’s lack of support to the 
Malian Army’s fight against the Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali.97 Initially, the coup 
d’état presented an opportunity for the Tuaregs and Anṣār al Dīne to exploit the isolated 
situation in Bamako, Mali by seizing decisive control of Northern Mali. Subsequently, 
violent extremist organizations (VEO) recognized an opportunity to further exacerbate 
the Northern Mali conflict and achieve governance under Sharia law. 
From January to mid-March 2012, the Malian Army faced resourcing and security 
challenges as they dealt with the Tuaregs and VEO support zones across the Trans Sahara 
(e.g., weapons smuggling and fighter transient lines from Libya). Yet, the DOS purported 
that Mali had a stable democratic government and significantly reduced poverty and 
improved the quality of life for many Malians.
98
 Under this premise, the DOS severely 
restricted AFRICOM’s training and operations in Northern Mali. To no avail, U.S. 
Special Operations Forces advisors to the Malian Army painted a dire operational 
environment in Northern Mali, through daily situation reports.
99
 Even during the coup 
d’état, the DOS and AFRICOM were at odds of providing net assessments to decision 
makers. Following the coup d’état, the DOS put their investments in Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish a regional security apparatus 
to defeat VEOs in Northern Mali. Ultimately, AFRICOM and the DOS did not use a 
collaborative strategy to deal with the spillage of the Near Eastern problem set in Libya 
(i.e., the Tuaregs’ ties to the late Muammar al-Qaddafi). 
                                                 
96 The Tuareg identity is a Berber/Muslim worldview, with a nomadic pastoralist lifestyle. The 
Tuaregs are an indigenous society stretching across the Trans Sahara desert region. 
97 Arieff, Crisis in Mali, 4–5. 
98 U.S. Department of State, “Situation in Mali,” U.S. Department of State, accessed May 10, 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/186633.htm.   
99 Joint Special Operations Task Force—Trans Sahara, “Daily Commander’s Update Brief: Mali 




C. WICKED PROBLEM CHARACTERISTICS 
Rittel and Webber contended that wicked problem embodies 10 distinct 
characteristics (see Table 11).
100
 Decision analysts must objectively assess whether the 
problem meets the majority, if not all, of the characteristics. In the Case of Northern 
Mali, the author conducted a macro analysis of the PMESII-PT domains to appraise the 
10 characteristics and determine whether the conflict was in wicked problem territory. 
The aforementioned activity map in Figure 12 served to illustrate the high level of 
multifaceted interactions between the eight PMESII-PT domains, 17 major stakeholders, 
macro problems and associated solutions from “etic and emic”101 perspectives. 
Table 11.   Characteristics of Wicked Problem Territory102 
 
In terms of the formulation attribute, the conflict in Northern Mali does not have a 
definitive problem statement. Rittel and Webber aptly asserted that defining the problem 
is commensurate with finding solutions; however, the decision analyst cannot define or 
understand the context of the problem statement without finding the solution(s) at the 
outset.
103
 Although the activity map does not pinpoint a precise solution set, “an image of 
the problem and of the solution emerges gradually among the [stakeholders], as a product 
                                                 
100 Rittel and Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 155–169. 
101 The terms emic and etic refer to two types of viewpoints of human behavior. The emic view 
considers how indigenous populations think. This internal or localized point of view (i.e., impartial) is how 
indigenous populations perceive the world, categorize others, behave, and rationalize things. The etic view 
is a more scientific approach (i.e., objective) using external observations, rather than internal or local 
observations. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 161. 
  
 81 
of incessant judgment, subjected to critical argument.” 104 By using the PMESII-PT 
domains and considering more than numerous stakeholders in the conflict, the 
information required to comprehend the dynamic problem led to numerous ideas to deal 
with the conflict (see Table 13). With too many conceptions and solutions, analysts will 
never truly know when they have found the “right” solution. In other words, the Northern 
Mali conflict has no “stopping rule,” due to the various stakeholders in the epoch of 
diffused power (i.e., non-state actors influencing and operating in the ungoverned 
political spaces of the Trans Sahara region). In dealing with Stakeholder Group A (see 
Table 12), the immeasurable solutions range from worse to good; therefore, without a 
true appraisal or enumeration of solutions, decision makers may settle on a solution type 
that is “good enough.” Thus far, Northern Mali is in wicked problem territory, because 
the cascading effects of influencing the problem set over time prevents analysts from 
testing solutions for accuracy. Even worse, there are no “do-overs,” since solutions have 
irrevocable effects. Rittel and Webber contended that every solution to a wicked problem 
is a “one-shot operation,” because analysts have no right or opportunity to learn by trial 
and error.
105
 Every solution that decision makers endorse for execution counts and has 
waves of effects that may induce another unique wicked problem. Therefore, analysts are 








                                                 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., 163. 
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Table 12.   Northern Mali Conflict: Stakeholders Groups A, B, and C 
 
D. USING PMESII–PT 
Previously, the activity map in Figure 12 illustrated 11 solutions and 12 problems, 
which are neither exhaustive nor conclusive (also see Table 13). Each of these solutions 
and problems can potentially multiply into other unique sets of solutions and problems, 
due to interdependencies among stakeholders and complexities surrounding the PMESII-
PT domains. For example, one political solution is to reach a preliminary agreement 
following Mali’s 2013 presidential election and continue inclusive peace talks with the 
Tuareg groups, MNLA, and HCUA. These agreements would undertake a redeployment 
of the coalition forces throughout Northern Mali. Clearly, this solution does not even 
consider half of the major stakeholders involved in the conflict or the residual problems. 
In another example, a military solution might be for the Western coalition in partnership 
with African regional security apparatuses to impose a military intervention in the form 
of counterterrorism, counter insurgency, or direct action operations. Likewise, this 
scenario (1) minimizes African players in Stakeholder Group B while creating a façade of 
multinational operations; (2) neglects critical players in Stakeholder Group A (e.g., 
passive Tuareg Tribal Leaders); and (3) shuns players in Stakeholder Group C (e.g., 







Table 13.   Using PMESII-PT to Identify Solutions and Problems 
 
 
E. A COLLABORATIVE STRATEGY FOR NORTHERN MALI 
As identified by the proposed solutions in the activity map and the PMESII-PT 
summary table, a collaborative strategy could potentially bring more players to the 
negotiation table. By building coalitions, the stakeholder groups might find better 
solutions that address critical problems in Northern Mali, while reducing negative 
externalities imposed on one another. Rather than a zero-sum game, coalitions would 
then face a partial sum game where players agree to maximize their strategic position or 
remain at status quo. The idea is to get stakeholder groups to shift from a competitive 
strategy to a collaborative strategy to maximize their payoffs, which would not otherwise 
occur without collaboration. Moreover, the finer points of collaboration could identify the 
social aspect of players in Stakeholder Group B reframing the sacred values of key 
players in Stakeholder Groups A and C. Through a collaborative strategy, players can 
maximize their payoffs and tackle what the coalition deems as the crux of the problem 
with acceptable risk factors, of which the coalition has already given concurrence. At the 
same time, however, the cost of including more players in the collaborative strategy can 
be detrimental. The coalition might face individual players’ opportunity costs that create 
barriers and delay negotiations. Players may perceive that a particular solution eliminates 
optimal alternatives. Ultimately, the situation in Northern Mali is so dynamic that 
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arriving at a consensus might prove too difficult for players to support a collective 
solution, among numerous mutually exclusive options, given inadequate resources and 
imperfect information. 
By applying Rittel and Webber’s process of determining wicked problem 
territory, decision analysts can tell a story grounded in morality and social context, which 
leads to a feasible development of the problem space unachievable by conventional 
approaches. However, with the intricate interdependencies of numerous stakeholders and 
differing worldviews, tackling wicked problems seems impossible at times in this age of 
design. Therefore, analysts must remain forthright as they purport to tame, cope, or tackle 
a wicked problem. In a complex, multi-polar environment where power and social media 
continue to empower individuals, analysts must carefully and responsibly making 
promises within the realm of possibility while including the entire system of stakeholders 
at the negotiation table. 
F. TELLING THE STORY: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 
Decision analysts must overcome conceptual roadblocks if they are to become 
more sophisticated thinkers and creative problem solvers. At the same time, leaders and 
facilitators must create conditions to allow analysts to overcome the conceptual blocks 
that obscure viable strategies to tackle wicked problems. In the end, however, it is 
incumbent upon analysts to effectively change the actual functioning of their thinking. As 
analysts assess their design structure, they must be introspective and wary of forming 
constructions of knowledge and mental process to diminish intellectual risk. Adams 
suggested that these structures are usually ones that have been tested, found to be 
successful in the past, and give us precision as we perform repetitive tasks.
106
 Therefore, 
as decision makers advocate a culture that relies on structures and models, analysts must 
recognize the constraints as they process information—especially in wicked problem 
territory. In the end, the author identifies personal conceptual blocks, which inhibit his 
framing, conceptualizing, and tackling of the ungoverned spaces of the Trans Sahara. 
                                                 




The case of Northern Mali provokes a wide range of solutions and problem 
statements amongst stakeholders. Despite a protracted impasse, decision analysts should 
be wary of advocating a taming strategy. Instead analysts should ethically and morally 
deal with the social context of the problem, rather than simplifying the problem to make 
it more manageable and solvable.
107
 Specifically, analysts should resort to coping 
strategies to tackle the wicked problem (e.g., authoritative, competitive, or collaborative). 
By determining the diffusion of power amidst stakeholders, the optimal coping strategy 
becomes clearer. In other words, analysts should determine if power is concentrated or 
contested to choose an authoritative, competitive, or collaborative strategy.
108
 At first 
glance, analysts might determine that power is contested and requires a competitive 
strategy; however, with further consideration of the waves of effects across the eight 
PMESII-PT domains and the associated solutions and problems, it may be more 
beneficial to use a collaborative strategy. 
As tumultuous relations between Western state-actors and fragile African states 
continue to grow, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) find solace in the ungoverned 
spaces of the Trans Sahara. In Northern Mali, al-Qaida has built coalitions with an 
indigenous nomadic tribe known as the Tuaregs to promulgate its brand and cause. To 
counteract al-Qaida’s influence in the region, the Malian central government (backed by 
Western state-actors) has attempted to execute various sustainable development policies 
aimed at eliminating violence, famine, and various economic disparities. Inadvertently, 
however, the Malian government continues exhibit a common pattern of recognizing a 
symptom and trying to fix it, only to find out that the “fix” caused another set of 
problems. To frame the problem effectively, design thinkers must unveil the underlying 
systemic structures by illustrating both behaviors and causal factors influencing the lack 
of sustainable development in the Trans Sahara. Anderson and Johnson suggested a 
systems thinking approach to layout the anatomy of problems with behavior over time 
                                                 
107 Conklin, Wicked Problems & Social Complexity, 11. 
108 Nancy Roberts, “Coping with Wicked Problems: The Case of Afghanistan,” Research in Public 
Policy Analysis and Management 11 (2001): 353–375, 357. 
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(BOT) diagrams and causal loop diagrams (CLD).
109
 As opposed to traditional analysis, 
the systems approach embodies the study of variables interacting with other constituents 
in a system to produce some behavior. With the BOT and CLD processes, decision 
analysts can offer salient recommendations to decision makers while formulating the 
problem, identifying the key variables, graphing the behavior of variables over time, and 
identifying the systemic structure. 
G. FORMULATING THE CORE PROBLEM  
The circumstances surrounding the ungoverned region of the Trans Sahara have 
persisted since ancient and medieval times. The Trans Sahara represents an intermediary 
region of desert lands spanning across Africa (i.e., stretching from the western states of 
Senegal and Mauritania through Algeria, Mali, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, and on toward the 
coastal states in the horn of Africa). This ungoverned region is as austere as it is 
unforgiving. What is more, the indigenous population consists of nomadic tribes (e.g., the 
Tuareg tribes) that have spawned amidst the empires that have conquered Africa 
throughout time. As the life blood of North Africa, the significance of the Trans Sahara 
stems from the well-established trade routes that channeled products, treasures, slaves, 
systems of transhumance, and other goods and services from West Africa to the 
Mediterranean, Western Europe, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East. 
With the looming challenges of globalization and conflicts of 21
st
 Century, the 
Saharan trade routes that facilitated the development of African cities are now being 
exploited by VEOs. With the help of unshakable nomadic tribes (i.e., Tuaregs) who have 
survived the harsh Saharan environment (via watering holes, oases, and rudimentary 
logistics points), the likes of al-Qaida and its affiliates have developed a strategic support 
zone. Naturally, many stakeholders have a vested interest in influencing the stability or 
instability of the ungoverned spaces of the Trans Sahara. 
In recent times (i.e., since the mid-1990s), one of the greatest threats to the 
stability of the Trans Sahara has been al-Qaida’s ability to franchise and propagate its 
                                                 




brand. The fear of Western state-actors and the African Union is al-Qaida’s small, agile, 
decentralized, and flattened networks of adaptable units broadening its use of the Trans 
Sahara to recruit, train, finance, and support its operations throughout Africa, Europe, and 
the Middle East. Where fragile states and weak governances exist, VEOs mutually 
support one another and exploit uncontested political spaces. Arguably, the cascading 
effects of Arab Awakening and the falls of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar al-
Qaddafi in Libya greatly influenced the instability that VEOs enjoy throughout the Trans 
Sahara. According to U.S., NATO, and AU stakeholders, the threats posed by VEOs 
present a clear and present danger.
110
 
From the Tuareg perspective, colonialists stripped nomadic tribes of their 
livelihood and a land to call their own. In the early 1960s, the decolonization of French 
imperial outposts created new African states. By the 1970s, African states like Algeria 
prevented the Tuaregs from taxing and securing nomadic commercial routes. The 
Tuaregs would later endure the severe Sahel droughts and famine of the mid-1970s to the 
early 1990s and rebel against the defense forces of Mali and Niger. The aftermath of 
these events led to disenfranchised Tuareg tribes, displaced sedentary families, deprived 
shantytowns, and transitions to semi-nomadic lifestyles of destitution. With the Islamic 
awakening movements throughout North Africa (e.g., the Arab Spring)111, falls of al-
Qaddafi and Mubarak, and the recent 2010 and 2012 droughts, perhaps the Tuaregs 
sought a strategy to prevent another wave of perceived threats to their identity.  
 
 
                                                 
110 2013 U.S. Africa Command Posture Statement: Statement of General Carter Ham before Senate Armed 
Services Committee 113th Cong (2013) (testimony of Carter Ham); NATO Defense College and Institute 
for Security Studies, AU–NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, ed. Brooke A. Smith–Windsor 
(Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, Research Division, 2013), 113–146. 
111 To clarify the notion of Islamic awakening movements, the analyst must also take note that where 
there are Islamists (i.e., those who read political philosophy and espouse politics informed by religious 
values), there is an enormous post-Islamist, post-colonialist sentiment expressed by peoples throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that can be facilitated by not making a fetish of Islam. 
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APPENDIX B. STEP I—SYSTEMS THINKING 
A. A ROADMAP FOR SYSTEMS THINKING  
The author presents two systems thinking tools to frame the wicked problem in 
Mali. First, the author uses the behavior over time (BOT) diagram to clarify the 
nonlinear, interrelated behavior of variables from 1990 to 2013. However, the BOT 
diagram is notional due to the absence of decision analysts on the ground. The second 
systems thinking tool is a causal loop diagram (CLD), which helps to identify possible 
“reinforcing” and “balancing” processes in the overall structure. Between the BOT 
diagram and CLD, analysts have a start point of the system’s behavior and dynamics. 
B. KEY VARIABLES USED TO CREATE THE SYSTEMS MODEL 
Before illustrating the BOT and CLD, decision analysts must highlight the key 
variables affecting the ungoverned spaces of Northern Mali. To be inclusive, these 
variables must derive from emic and etic perspectives of every key stakeholder in the 
conflict. Naturally, with numerous stakeholders who have a vested interest in the 
Northern Mali, analysts may never articulate every possible variable. To illustrate a 
strategic structure of stability in the ungoverned spaces, analysts should consider the 
subsystems of key stakeholders in the conflict. Moreover, analysts might focus on 
strategic locations in Northern Mali and assess the NSAs (e.g., Tuareg tribes) as 
stakeholder groups facing off against the Malian government as the opposing stakeholder 
group. Obviously, many other key players exist and are a part of this dynamic system. By 
designing the system’s structure around NSAs and the Malian central government, the 
following variables delineate the underlying issues in the Northern Mali. 
1. Level of Problem Symptoms 
This variable represents the government acknowledging or not acknowledging 
that a fix is merely alleviating a symptom or making a commitment to solve the real 
problem. If the government does not acknowledge that alleviating the symptom is only a 
short-run solution, this variable decreases. Ultimately, the government has the ability or 
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inability to define a problem in terms of its symptoms, thereby obscuring the real cause 
and leading to symptomatic solutions that fail to rectify the indispensable condition. 
2. Level of Fix 
This variable represents the Malian government’s short-run or long-run 
application of development policies and strategies. The government’s investments, 
interventions, and activities are ideally aimed at sustainable development in Northern 
Mali to reduce violence, famine, various economic disparities, and so forth. In the case of 
a short-run quick-fix, the government faces unintended consequences. With a long-run 
fixes, the government achieves sustainable development. 
3. Level of Unintended Consequences 
The key unintended consequence is violence. Due to the quick-fixes applied by 
the Malian government, the Tuaregs revert to coping strategies to prevent further 
alienation, marginalization, and disenfranchisement of the Tuaregs and their identity. The 
coping strategies may range from migrating to neighboring African states to transitioning 
from a nomadic to semi-nomadic society, responding in nonviolent protest, or responding 
in violence. In the latter coping strategy / unintended consequences, Tuareg rebels may 
collude with other VEOs thereby creating another set of unintended consequences and 
undermining the government’s ability to execute development strategies. 
With these interrelated variables, decision analysts would graph their behaviors 
across time (see Figure 13). Analysts could go back as far as the French Equatorial of 
Western Africa in the late 1800s or France’s decolonization efforts in the 1960s. 
However, analysts could responsibly assume some risk by commencing their timeline in 
the early 1990s and focusing their efforts in the Western Trans Sahara. By capturing the 
years leading up to VEOs (e.g., the Group for Call and Combat or GSPC) taking on the 
al-Qaida brand, analysts can still responsibly and ethically graph the behavior of the 
variables still playing out in the 21
st
 Century. This time period should give analysts 
nearly a decade of “behaviors” leading to the emergence of al-Qaida and its influence 
over VEOs and African states’ failing policies. 
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C. DEVELOP THE BOTS 
Generally speaking, the failing policies are symbolic of a “fixes that fail”112 
structure, which illustrates the Malian government’s inadequate management of 
sustainable development. The government’s development strategy seemingly has a 
beneficial effect, even though the long-term trend continues to depreciate. Similarly, 
there is an accrual of dynamic consequences, which expends resources and time that 
could have been used to fix the initial problem. An illustration of the enduring drawbacks 
of this scenario is apparent in Figure 13. Note the behavior and interrelatedness of the 
problem symptom and unintended consequences variables each time the Malian 
government applied fixes (denoted by the green triangles) that had unintended 
consequences and failed. Also, note that in one instance, the Malian government achieved 
nearly 10 years of relative stability and acceptable levels of government control, due to 
the 2006 Peace Accord and the resultant interventions that ended the Second Tuareg 
Rebellion from 1996–2007. See Figure 13 for an illustration of the BOT graph. 
 
Figure 13.  Behavior over Time Graph. 
                                                 


























D. DEVELOP THE CLD 
With the help of Western state-actors, Mali launched government interventions, 
which were initially successful. However, the government focused much of its efforts on 
its city centers to maximize its shared interests with Western countries. Ultimately, the 
government deferred its interventions in rural areas (i.e., shanty towns and key locations 
in the Trans Sahara), which support the livelihood of semi-nomadic and nomadic NSAs 
(i.e., Tuareg tribes). The impact of needed interventions had a negative development, 
which led to a perceived disenfranchisement and marginalization of the NSAs. 
Consequently, the NSAs’ compliance with the government dramatically declined over the 
last 23 years, and the government continually depressed its nation building capacities. 
See the CLD illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  Causal Loop Diagram.113 




E. DEEP STRUCTURE SYNTHESIS 
As the Malian government deals with what may seem like an inexplicably “fixes 
that fail” structure, it continues to apply short-range fixes with unintended consequences 
that exacerbate the problem. The CLD illustrates the notion that the problem symptom 
will diminish for a short time and subsequently revert to its previous state or degrade over 
time. Most likely, Malian policymakers are astounded at the problem, which they already 
fixed, taking on a life of its own and becoming worse than it was at the outset. This 
structure highlights the risks associated with “taming a problem”114 or oversimplifying 
the problem. Despite the good intentions of sustainable development, Malian 
policymakers repeatedly deal with unchanged problem symptoms, albeit in varying 
shades of gray. The underlying structure reveals the residual effects of policymakers 
assuming that problem symptoms are inimitable sets of conditions that exist in their own 
isolated subsystems, which are independent of other problem symptoms or portions of the 
larger system. Unfortunately, reductionalist thinking permits policymakers to rationally 
focus on the problem symptom as a reasonable and effective response.  
According to the CLD, the Malian policymakers’ response primarily targets the 
problem symptom, rather than devoting energy and time on identifying the underlying, 
systemic problem. The “unintended consequences” variable, which materializes from the 
short-range fix, functions as a reinforcing loop (or R2) and further exacerbates the 
original problem symptom. Ultimately, R2 contains a delay and contributes to a 
progressively deteriorating problem symptom, due to the short-range fix. Although the 
CLD points toward appreciating or improving the “fixes that fail” structure, by targeting 
the delay in the balancing loop, policymakers should still exercise caution as they 
intervene. As time lapses between the fix and the deteriorating problem symptoms, 
policymakers will find it quite difficult to identify the relationship between the fix and the 
worsening problem symptoms. According to the CLD, Malian policymakers likely have a 
tendency to attribute the degenerating problem symptom to other contributors, rather than 
finding culpability in their efforts to fix the problem symptoms. Notwithstanding its 
                                                 
114 Roberts, Coping with Wicked Problems: The Case of Afghanistan, 368–369. 
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outwardly simplistic structure, the “fixes that fail” structure is a problem that is wicked 
and tough to tackle. To improve this structure, policymakers must cast aside 
reductionalistic models, which preclude the recognition of the links between the “visible” 
problem symptoms and the fixes policymakers apply to alleviate the problem symptoms. 
F. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE BOTS AND CLD 
Since the BOT diagrams and CLD only serve as a start point, decision analysts 
would need to collect data to simulate and verify the system’s structure and make 
necessary modifications for further analysis. Although qualitative and quantitative results 
may facilitate a timely decision-making process (via CLD simulation), analysts would 
still need to constantly reassess the dynamic structure, look for repeating patterns of 
quick fixes, determine how often these fixes occurred, and compare their findings against 
the frequency with which the Malian government characteristically appraises its 
performance. Ultimately, sponsors, conveners, and design teams must remain vigilant of 
conceptual blocks that make us “prisoners of the system or prisoners of our own 
thinking.”115 If analysts were recommending strategies to stabilize the Northern Mali, 
they would likely face the quandary of advising leaders about the significance of time 
delays that affect the level of unintended consequences. This dilemma compounds if 
leaders do not take action in a timely manner, because the opportunities and threats that 
presented themselves may change drastically over time. 
 
                                                 
115 Senge, The Fifth Discipline, 58–67. 
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APPENDIX C. STEP II—DESIGN THINKING 
A. STEP II—IDENTIFY: DESIGN THINKING 
Over the last decade, the Malian government has launched contradictory 
government interventions, which were initially successful; however, it focused on short-
run remedies that would eventually fail. Even worse, these quick fixes targeted the 
problem symptoms inherent to the austere ungoverned spaces of the Trans Sahara. From 
the perspective of violent non–state-actors (NSAs), the Malian government applied end-
run interventions (i.e., fixes that bypassed the barriers that are fundamental to the original 
problem), while politically targeting its loyal constituencies in key city centers to 
maximize its national interests. These quick fixes led to violent NSAs perceiving a 
feeling of disenfranchisement and marginalization. As a result, violent NSAs continue to 
disregard the government and destabilize the region, while the Malian government 
continually applies “fixes that fail,” which only served to depress its nation building 
capacities.  
First, the author defines key interrelated variables to segue into the major causal 
factors in the problem. Next, the author presents two projects that decision analysts might 
apply at an intervention point (i.e., the unintended consequences) in the wicked problem. 
Provided that the two projects are long-term investments, the author explores the notion 
that the government can propose a “new idea” that is widely accepted and serves as the 
cornerstone of sustainable development. Finally, the author prototypes the new idea in an 
effort to sway others to accept and commit to the intervention. 
B. TACKLING WICKED PROBLEMS WITH DESIGN THINKING 
From one perspective, the Malian government entered wicked problem territory, 
when violent NSAs began destabilizing the Trans Sahara in a collaborative effort. 
Perhaps a “perfect storm” occurred when the Tuaregs pursued coping strategies by 
rebelling against the government to save their Tuareg identity, Berber/Muslim 
worldview, and nomadic lifestyle, while al–Qaida was promulgating its brand and vision 
of Islam. Although the government recognizes that a problem exists, its decision makers 
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were merely applying quick fixes that ignored the unintended consequences and 
exacerbated the originating problem. Unfortunately, the government focused on the 
problem symptoms, which had the tendency to diminish for a short period and revert to 
the initial problem. Instead, the government should have applied long-term, sustainable-
development projects (i.e., political, economic, social, and military interventions that 
reduced violence, famine, various economic disparities, and so forth). With long-term 
fixes geared toward sustainable development, decision makers would have broken the 
cycle of repeatedly tackling unsolvable problem symptoms. As a result, the government 
would take synoptic approaches to tackle a “systems of problems.”116 By encouraging 
design teams to devote their maximum energy and time on the causal, systemic problems, 
conveners and decision makers can finally develop guidance, policies, and strategies that 
ably tackle the “unintended consequence” variable. Thus, the interventions of sustainable 
development have the potential to materialize and address the original problem.  
C. IDENTIFY AN INTERVENTION POINT 
Rather than espousing oversimplifying modeling assumptions with claims of 
“ceteris paribus,” Malian policymakers and decision makers must tackle reality of the 
wicked problem head on. Making this responsible mental leap allows the government to 
intervene only when long-term “fixes” do more good than harm and embody the most 
manageable consequences. Although quick fixes seemingly extend decision makers’ 
timeline to eventually solve the root problem, short-term and long-term interventions are 
diametrically opposed. Therefore, to avoid the vicious cycle of solving problem 
symptoms of yesterday, analysts should tackle the wicked problem along two approaches:  
D. IDENTIFY THE INTERVENTION 
Decision analysts can significantly intervene in the causal loop diagram at the 
unintended consequences variable through TSI 2.0 sustainable-development projects, 
which consist of land rehabilitation and integrated, indigenous security forces. 
                                                 
116 Ackoff, Redesigning the Future. 
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1. The Reversal of Desertification 
For decades, the Sahel has been a hostile and austere region that separates the 
economies of the Mediterranean and the Niger basin. Perhaps African nations would 
revitalize the Sahel, if the expected benefits outweighed the costs. Although the Sahara 
has always been the lifeblood of Africa, the cascading effects of desertification have 
prevented African nations from taking serious action against this dynamic phenomenon. 
Desertification is a vicious blend of interrelated climatological and manmade variables 
that degrade the lands of arid regions. Before the southern encroachment of 
desertification into Mali’s city centers (e.g., Timbuktu), the Tuaregs relatively prospered 
and maintained a degree of agricultural and livestock. In fact, along the southern border 
of the Trans Sahara, the Tuaregs once thrived in the vast trading empires of the Sahel 
region, despite intermittent droughts and famine. However, as desertification amplified, 
the Trans Sahara’s ecological zone grew more fragile and less capable of sustaining the 
rising population. Ultimately, the destructiveness of desertification, coupled with 
foreseeable droughts and famine, increased demands on the terrain. Therefore, decision 
analysts might explore forestation projects to halt the southwardly encroaching desert and 
regain key locations lost to the Sahel’s desert (e.g., forestation of cities and networked 
oases and wells). 
The climatic variables affecting desertification (e.g., arid conditions and droughts) 
are not the only factors contributing to the real problem, nor are the broad claims of 
nomads destroying the region by putting too much pressure on the land (e.g., 
overgrazing). By acknowledging the social context of the situation, decision analysts will 
consider internal and external factors affecting Mali’s failure to tackle desertification, 
droughts, and famine in the Sahel. Specifically, analysts might consider the history of 
trans-Saharan governments interfering with the indigenous system of property rights and 
market interactions, followed by African governments’ collectivist policies and aid from 
other nations, which also intensified pressure on the land. 
To reverse desertification, design teams should explore the history two distinct 
populations of the Trans Sahara inhabiting the region: nomads and sedentary farmers. 
From this traditional perspective, decision analysts would find that nomads and sedentary 
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farmers were bound together by an elaborate structure of trade markets and division of 
labor, which allowed them to consume existing resources without decimating the 
environment. For example, analysts would explore the history of Tuaregs (nomadic 
tribes) deriving profits from cattle (e.g., sheep and goats) and Trans Saharan trade. 
Central to the Tuaregs’ successful trading were their strategically networked water wells, 
which were owned and strictly regulated by the clans that excavated them. If the 
government revitalized oases throughout the Trans Sahara and worked with Tuareg clans’ 
leaders, from a private market approach, the Tuaregs would grant rights, regulate water 
rights, and contract networked water wells. This project would revitalize the Tuaregs 
network of wells to support their cattle and trade and indirectly support integrated 
(Tuareg–Malian) security projects along the Trans Saharan trade routes. Although the 
Tuaregs would privately own their cattle, the Tuareg clans would control the networked 
water wells and pasture lands. With limited help from the government (e.g., reforestation 
of strategic oases, excavating more networked wells, building salt traps, and providing 
limited veterinary and medical assistance), the Tuaregs would regulate the communal 
ownership of the pasture, mitigate overgrazing, limit usage of each well, and constrain 
the number of cattle that individual households own. Ultimately, with limited government 
help, the Tuaregs could develop a system of fully defined property rights to insulate its 
people from droughts, famine, and the spread of desertification.  
2. Governments’ Land Usage Contribution to Desertification 
To promote solidarity, the government must reconsider projects like uranium 
mining, which contaminates and depletes crucial sources of groundwater and diminishes 
grazing lands. Uranium exploitation creates a lack of water and forces competition 
among Saharan communities for scarce resources. To reduce tensions, the government 
must work alongside the Tuaregs to monitor and regulate the rights of networked wells 
and mitigate overgrazing to relieve pressure on the land and its resources. In the same 
light, to prevent stagnation, the government must reassure the Tuaregs that the cattle 
market is reliable and incentivize them to maintain herds that the land can feasibly 
sustain. In time, the Tuaregs would prevent deforestation and overgrazing of collectively 
owned land. Just as the clans’ leaders regulated well usage, they would have to regulate 
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the depletion of forests to maintain the soil in oases projects and forestation projects in 
the city centers. Ultimately, to prevent the Tuaregs from “tragedy of the commons,” the 
project must foster responsible policymaking, strengthen property rights, and promote 
healthy land-use practices. 
3. Reversal of Desertification and Oases Experiments  
Incontrovertibly, strategic arable locations are vital for the inhabitants of Northern 
Mali, and it is especially essential for nomadic Tuaregs. Projects aimed at reversing 
desertification (i.e., the swelling of arid, desert lands) in key locations could have positive 
effects (e.g., contribute to climate change and induce the Tuaregs compliance with central 
governance). As a threat to sustainable development, the menacing spread of 
desertification should prompt every stakeholder to collaborate. By reversing 
desertification, the Malian oases project could potentially alleviate other deficits (e.g., 
poverty, famine, and refugee migrations). However, decision makers must ensure that the 
interventions help the indigenous populace use the asset—strategic oases and 
forestation—sustainably. In effect, Northern Mali would serve as a start point to become 
a transnational engine for sustainable development throughout the Trans Sahara. 
In the backdrop, Malian leaders must constantly measure the political will of each 
stakeholder affected by the intervention. First, the leaders must assess its own and its 
constituents’ political will by determining its willingness to invest in launching the 
Reversal of Desertification project. Decision makers must weigh the costs, risks, and 
benefits of investing some percentage of its discretionary and mandatory budgets into the 
build-out of oases refuges, agriculture opportunities, and issues of famine and food 
insecurities. Ultimately, political will calls on all Malians to consider long-term, 
coordinated interventions that will address the country’s ability to tackle climate change 
and espouse all aspects of biological diversity to reverse the growing desertification 
problem. With an effective forestation / oases project, the Malian government could work 





use manure as fertilizer, use terracing for landscaping, develop salt traps to retain 
groundwater, use irrigation improvements, regulate rotational grazing to reduce pressure 
on oases, and other sustainable developments.  
4. The Integration of Indigenous Security Forces 
Following France’s decolonization of North Africa in the 1960s, the traditional 
Tuareg territory was transferred to several African nations of the Sahel (e.g., 
Mali, Algeria, Niger, and Libya). This division created competition for resources and 
sparked major conflicts between the African nations and the Tuaregs. Meanwhile, 
desertification continued to invade southwardly, while economic constraints and political 
issues followed African nations’ independence from France. For example, Mali began to 
place tight restrictions on nomadization, due to population growth, which affected the 
Tuaregs. Implementing this policy sought to alleviate the problem symptom of 
desertification being exacerbated by nomadic activity; however, restricting nomadization 
forced the Tuaregs to abandon their life style, begin farming, and seek jobs in towns and 
cities. Since Mali’s independence, the Tuaregs have rebelled against the new state of 
Mali in three to four rebellions (e.g., the Azawad and Kidal regions of Northern Mali), 
depending on whose historical account analysts chose to acknowledge.  
Although the notion of integrating the Tuaregs into African militaries is not a new 
concept (e.g., the French–Algerian initiation of the 1992 peace accord117), the Malian 
government can revisit lessons learned and only pursue long-term investments that look 
beyond the transference of central governance and pledge of integrating Tuaregs into 
Mali’s defense forces. For example, the Integration of Security Forces project should 
incorporate the development of Berberism and the Tuareg ethnic revival developed since 
the 1990s. Furthermore, as the government integrates the Tuaregs, it should ensure that 
the Tuaregs do not continue to perceive the integration as diplomatically and 
economically marginalizing. For example, the Tuaregs should secure the Saharan trade 
routes, oases / forestation projects, networked watering wells, and so forth. In doing so, 
                                                 
117 Jennifer C. Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg Threat in Mali,” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 39, no. 03 (2001): 499–524. 
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the cascading effects would not only help to reframe the government’s position on the 
Tuaregs’ identity and drive a wedge between VEOs and violent NSAs,118 but it also 
restores the Tuaregs’ matrilineal lines that once exalted the high status of Tuareg women 
(i.e., even higher than that of their Muslim and Arab counterparts). With men no longer 
settling as agriculturalists or semi-nomadic herdsmen, they can revitalize the Tuaregs’ 
reliance on matriarchs as they secure jobs as nomads, soldiers, caravan leaders, and so 
forth. 
5. The Cascading Effects of the Projects 
With projects to secure Sahel trade routes, support oases build-outs, and sustain 
other micro-projects that reverse desertification, the Malian government could combat 
further degradation of the desert. By combating desertification, the Malian government 
can finally begin to deal with issues surrounding droughts, famine, migration, and armed 
crises. With buy-in from the indigenous population, the government in concert with other 
African nations can finally complete and improve the Trans-Saharan Highway, which has 
the potential to create jobs, boost the economy, and improve stability in the region. 
However, the key is for African nations to abstain from tempting quick fixes (e.g., 
excavating the Sahara for its hidden treasures, providing fiber-optic connectivity, and 
building pipelines for gas and oil transportation, and so forth). The Saharan projects must 
get buy-in from the indigenous populace and give primacy to the social welfare of the 
indigenous population before pursuing alternate agendas. Otherwise, the mutual benefits 
of other African nations would be for naught. Al-Qaida and other violent NSAs would 
easily exploit short-run and end-run fixes with strategic messaging and spoiling terrorist 
attacks if necessary. Mali would have to take on heavy costs and risks as a commitment 
to its long-term fixes. For example, in addition to the forestation project, the government 
could propose a power generation project (i.e., a solar and wind energy project) that 
                                                 
118 The al-Qaddafi regime championed the Tuaregs, who became reliable, regime protectors fighting 
against the Libyan revolution. His Tuareg entourage provided support networks throughout the remote 
sanctuaries of the Trans Sahara. Al-Qaddafi understood the advantages of enticing the Tuaregs, by 
embracing them in his pan-African movement to protect his interests. With the Trans Sahara and the 
Tuaregs serving as a buffer against opponents, al-Qaddafi sought to create a support infrastructure that 
would ensure his regime’s survivability. VEOs also recognized the Tuaregs’ capabilities and leveraged 
these strengths as well, as evidenced by the 2012 takeover of Northern Mali. 
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supports Saharan trading by making jobs available predominately to the indigenous 
populace: security forces, energy plant jobs, government jobs to manage property rights, 
and so forth. Ultimately, the projects must consider the full magnitude of political, social, 
economic, and military problems that come with the Sahel. However, the government 
would have to champion a convener who is a consummate environmentalist / social 
entrepreneur capable of managing networks of talented Africans, strategically managing 
the movement of goods and services, and collaborating with various African 
governments, industries, academia, and non-governmental organizations. The convener’s 
vision must trickle to the decision analysts who must help to carry the African torch of 
prototyping the new idea of transforming Northern Mali’s movement of solidarity. 
Additionally, the Malian government can deal with education and job creation, 
technological advancements, poverty alleviation, and forestation efforts. Ultimately, the 
Malian government would principally demonstrate the ability to seek indigenous subject 
matter experts to shoulder the majority of the tasks.  
Figure 15 represents the first draft of a prototype prior to developing the two IP 
models presented in the preceding chapters. However, the project designs in Chapters VI 
and VII share the same logic as the preliminary prototype. Ultimately, Figure 18 






Figure 15.  Implementing a Sustainable Development in Northern Mali  
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The roadblocks that decision analysts may encounter with applying interventions 
are denoted by the “opened and closed networks” of stakeholders. Each region in the 
Sahel has its unique set of stakeholders that present obstructions to government 
interventions. Therefore, analysts must establish collaborative networks to accomplish 
sustainable development. With each region, analysts must tailor their implementation of 
Projects 1 and 2.  
1. Design 1 incorporates Project 1, Project 2, and exporting both projects to 
other critical locations in the Sahel.  
2. Design 2 incorporates Project 1 and Project 2.  
3. Design 3 only incorporates Project 2.  
4. All three design approaches are three-phased operations from which 
decision analysts can tailor and blend government interventions as 
necessary. 
6. Recommendations for Building Partner Capacity  
By prototyping a project that targets the point of intervention, decision analysts 
can deductively get to the core of the problem. In terms of identifying a prototype, the 
two projects highlighted the following lessons learned: 
1. Raise the Malian government’s awareness of unintended consequences  
2. Reframe the root problem, and dismiss quick fixes to solve problem 
symptoms 
3. Proactively reassess the unintended consequences, and select long-term 
interventions that do no harm and plan for consequence management.  
4. Be highly selective and limit the frequency of applying enduring fixes.  
More importantly, the design approach gave a salient perspective from which to 
understand and improve the intervention. By tailoring the prototype to each strategic 
location throughout Northern Mali (see Figure 15), decision makers have a greater 
chance at achieving success. In doing so, other African nations may be encouraged and 
motivated to employ design teams to collectively tackle the Trans Sahara’s wicked 
problem. Ultimately, the Malian prototype / project would serve as an example (i.e., the 
notion of exporting the new idea) from which other African nations can modify as they 




Sahara rely on contiguous support zones and safe havens that are not bounded by state 
borders. Therefore, the Trans Sahara project must be networked and collaborative as 
well. 
In the meantime, Northern Mali would serve well as a test-bed for the project. The 
systematic development of sustainable oases experiments, integrated security forces, and 
reversal of desertification, can potentially serve as a model for other African nations of 
the Trans Sahara. In time, other African nations would have the metrics decision makers 
need to derive cost–benefit decision analyses and launch evidence-based projects. By 
getting at the social context of the situation, Malian policymakers lead by example and 
showcase how the Trans Saharan project has the potential to propagate from the Western 
Sahara to the far reaches of the Horn of Africa. In the intervening time, Malian envoys 
and diplomats can engage African leaders of other nations to bring in future stakeholders 
at the outset to garner mutual support and identify political and social challenges unique 
to each African state. After all, to achieve the notion of sustainable development, the 
long-term intervention must be a collective effort. 
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APPENDIX D. INPUT DATA FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
The sum of the following factors is equal to ci as expressed in Chapter VI:  
 1 0,1i   population density 
 2 0,1i  existing bodies of water 
 3 0,1i   flood frequency 
 4 0,1i  drought mortality risk 
 5 0,1i   cropland intensity 
 6 0,1i   illicit routes 
 7 0,1i   violent NSA-controlled territory 
 8 0,1i   significant activities (SIGACTS) 
For Model II, analysts use the following criteria for 'ic : 
 1' 0,1i   population density 
 2' 0,1i   existing bodies of water 
 3' 0,1i   flood frequency 
 4' 0,1i   drought mortality risk 
 5' 0,1i   cropland intensity 
 6' 0,1i   illicit routes 
 7' 0,1i  violent NSA-controlled territory 
 8' 0,1i   significant activities (SIGACTS) 
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A. FACTOR 1, DEVELOPMENT: POPULATION DENSITY 
Northern Mali is a highly diverse region of the Trans Sahara. Unlike the southern 
region of Mali, where most of the government focuses its economic and development 
activities, the population of Northern Mali lives in poverty and austere desert conditions. 
Sustainable agriculture activities must expand to Northern Mali to improve development, 
employment, free trade, the gross domestic product, and more.  
Figures 16 and 17 are screenshots of City Population and the World Bank 
Group’s web-based tools. The data for 1i  are derived by zooming into each region and 
reading the population densities for each of the 47 communes. 
 
Figure 16.  Factor 1: Population (Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou)119 
                                                 




Figure 17.  Factor 1: Population Density (Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou)120 
B. FACTOR 2, DEVELOPMENT: EXISTING BODIES OF WATER 
Only 14 percent of the country’s land area is considered suitable for agriculture 
(e.g., millet, sorghum millet, cotton, and rice), which makes sustainable land management 
a major concern.121 Therefore, the “existing bodies of water” factor is essential. Figure 
18 is a screenshot of The World Bank Group’s web-based tools. The data are derived by 
zooming into each region and reading the population densities for all 47 communes. 
 
Figure 18.  Factor 2: Existing Bodies of Water (Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou)122 
                                                 





C. FACTOR 3, DEVELOPMENT: FLOOD FREQUENCY 
“Flood frequency” factor assesses the expansion of agriculture, coupled with poor 
land management practices. On the Niger River flood plain, the region has significantly 
increased erosion and sedimentation, and the propensity of some areas to experience 
severe flooding and subsequent crop loss. 123 The average number of flood events per 100 
years was based on observed flood data from 1999 to 2007.124 
Figure 19 is a screenshot of The World Bank Group’s web-based tools. The data 
for 3i  are derived by zooming into each region and determining the flood frequencies 
for each of the 47 communes. 
 
Figure 19.  Factor 3: Flood Frequency (Gao and Tombouctou)125 






D. FACTOR 4, DEVELOPMENT: DROUGHT MORTALITY RISK 
The “drought mortality risk” factor considers the threat on development and food 
security and their intensity and frequency.126 The recent droughts forced pastoralists to 
remain near permanent water sources leading to considerable overgrazing. The predicted 
increases in temperatures, coupled with reduced or erratic rainfall are likely to continue to 
make natural hazards more frequent and severe. Without improved planning and 
management, the incidence and impacts of these disasters will increase. Figure 20 is a 
screenshot of The World Bank Group’s web-based tools. The data for 4i  are derived by 
zooming into each region and reading the population densities for each of the 47 
communes. 
 
Figure 20.  Factor 4: Drought Mortality Risk (Gao and Tombouctou)127 





E. FACTOR 5, DEVELOPMENT: CROPLAND INTENSITY 
The “cropland intensity” considers the estimated cultivated land as of 1992. 
Figure 21 is a screenshot of The World Bank Group’s web-based tools. The data for 5i  
are derived by zooming into each region and determining the cropland intensities for each 
of the 47 communes. 
 
Figure 21.  Factor 5: Cropland Intensity (Gao and Kidal)128 
F. FACTOR 6, THREAT: ILLICIT ROUTES  










Figure 22.  Factor 6: Threat Situation Template Map129 
                                                 
129 Philippe Rekacewicz, “Sahara–Sahel: Movements and Routes,” Le Monde Diplomatique, http://mondediplo.com/maps/saharasahel. 
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G. FACTOR 7, THREAT: VIOLENT NSA / VEO CONTROL 
Figures 23 and 24 are screenshots of unclassified threat situation maps found 
online. The data for 7i  are derived by zooming into each region and determining 
whether VEOs control any of the 47 communes. 
 
Figure 23.  Factor 7: Conflict Zones in Northern Mali: VEOs and NSAs130  
                                                 





Figure 24.  Factor 7: Conflict Zones in Northern Mali: VEOs and NSAs131 
H. FACTOR 8, THREAT: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES 
Figures 25 and 26 are screenshots of unclassified threat situation maps found 
online (also refer to Figures 22, 23, and 24). The data for 8i  are derived by zooming 
into each region and accounting for significant activities (i.e., VEO operations, major 
fighting between coalition and VEOs, and so forth) for each of the 47 communes.
                                                 





Figure 25.  Factor 8: Threat Overview Map 1132 
                                                 
132 2013 U.S. Africa Command Posture Statement: Statement of General Carter Ham before Senate Armed Services Committee 113th Cong (2013) 




Figure 26.  Factor 8: Threat Overview Map 2133
                                                 
133 European Country of Origin Information Network, Mali: Armed Conflict and Populations Movement, ( https://www.ecoi.net/mali/maps. 
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I. SUMMARY OF COMMUNE QUALITY SCORES 
Table 14 illustrates the raw data that analysts might gather to derive the ci and c’i for each commune.  




APPENDIX E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In the absence of accurate data, a simulation-based sensitivity analysis of the 
input variables should assist the decision analyst in maximizing rehabilitation and 
optimally allocating projects.134 The simulation forecasts the rehabilitation scores, by 
comparing two extreme scenarios to each other and to a base case. 
In this setup, the simulation runs five trials (one-thousand times per trial) for each 
project design against all three scenarios. Also, the simulation runs trials to address three 
commune scenarios for each project design. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the threat 
level in Northern Mali, each of the scenarios has an equal chance of happening (i.e., a 
uniform distribution). 
Without accurate data, the simulation uses a triangular distribution (see Figures 
27, 30, 33, and 36) to set up for the initial Monte Carlo simulation.135 In a worst-case 
scenario, the analyst should assume some minimum quality score for 1ic . In the likely 
scenario, the analyst should assume a base quality score for 2ic . In a best-case scenario, 
the analyst should assume some maximum quality score for 3ic . See the variable 
descriptions and scores below. 
                                                 
134 Sensitivity analysis allows the analyst to simulate the uncertainty in the output of the IP models. 
The analyst can simulate the apportionment of scores along different conditions of uncertainty. Therefore, 
the sensitivity analysis allows the analyst to test the robustness of the IP models’ outputs in the case of 
uncertainty. Furthermore, analysts can test the relationships between input variables and the output 
variables in the IP model. Commensurate with this thesis, analysts can clarify their interpretation of the IP 
models so that decision makers better understand the strength of the model as they collaborate with 
policymakers. This added level of analysis lends more credibility to the IP models, and it may give the 
AFRICOM commander more influence with the U.S. ambassador to Mali. 
135 The Monte Carlo method was invented by scientists working on the atomic bomb in the 1940s, 
who named it for the city in Monaco famed for its casinos and games of chance. Its core idea is to use 
random samples of parameters or inputs to explore the behavior of a complex system or process. Since that 
time, Monte Carlo methods have been applied to an incredibly diverse range of problems in science, 
engineering, and finance and business applications in virtually every industry. This Monte Carlo simulation 
was used to make an estimated forecast due to uncertainty. Otherwise, the IP model could be significantly 




A. SIMULATED INPUT VARIABLES 
The Monte Carlo simulation uses the following variables: ,  ,  and ih jh hjc p  . 
Let 
hj  be the development scenario h for each project design j , where 





























The simulation assumes a uniform distribution for
hj . 
Let 
jhp  be the project design j for each development scenario h ; where 





























The simulation assumes a triangular distribution for
jhp (see the top illustration 
outlined with red borders in Figures 27, 30, 33, and 36). 
Let ihc  be the commune scenario score for each development scenario h , where 





























The simulation assumes a triangular distribution for ihc (see the bottom illustration 
outlined with blue borders in Figures 27, 30, 33, and 36). 
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1. Simulated Coefficients 
Let hijQ be the simulated rehabilitation scores, where 
 
     
( )
and  1,2,3 ,  1,2,3,4 ,  and  1,2,3,4





2. Summary of Simulated Rehabilitation per Project Design Type 
The Monte Carlo simulation generated the following rehabilitation scores per 
project design: 
1. On average, Project Design 1 yielded a maximum rehabilitation of 24.2. 
2. On average, Project Design 2 yielded a maximum rehabilitation of 33.5. 
3. On average, Project Design 3 yielded a maximum rehabilitation of 21.9. 
4. On average, Project Design 4 yielded a maximum rehabilitation of 7.29. 
3. Simulated Objective Function  








  (28) 
Ultimately, Model I assumed an uncertain environment and determined the total 
maximum rehabilitation score  = 82.5Z . The simulator forecasted a total maximum 
rehabilitation score '''  86.8Z  for an uncertain environment. 
4. Summary of Results from the Sensitivity Analysis 
In a permissive environment, the total maximum rehabilitation score is 
approximately '''  = 97.4Z . To achieve this amount of rehabilitation, AFRICOM would 
have to allocate 24 projects in the following fashion: 
For 1 1iQ , 6 projects are available. 
For 1 2iQ , 8 projects are available. 
For 1 3iQ , 7 projects are available. 
For 1 4iQ , 3 projects are available. 
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In an uncertain environment, the total maximum rehabilitation score is 
approximately '''  = 86.8Z . To achieve this amount of rehabilitation, AFRICOM would 
have to allocate 20 projects in the following fashion: 
For 2 1iQ , 5 projects are available. 
For 2 2iQ , 7 projects are available. 
For 2 3iQ , 6 projects are available. 
For 2 4iQ , 2 projects are available. 
In a hostile environment, the total maximum rehabilitation score is approximately 
'''  = 74.0Z . To achieve this amount of rehabilitation, AFRICOM would have to allocate 
16 projects in the following fashion: 
For 3 1iQ , 4 projects are available. 
For 3 2iQ , 6 projects are available. 
For 3 3iQ , 5 projects are available. 
For 3 4iQ , one project is available. 
With the Monte Carlo simulation, on average, the total maximum rehabilitation 
score '''  = 86.8Z . To achieve this amount of rehabilitation, AFRICOM would have to 
allocate 20 projects in the following fashion: 
For 2 1iQ , five projects are available. 
For 2 2iQ , seven projects are available. 
For 2 3iQ , six projects are available. 
For 2 4iQ , two projects are available. 
B. PROJECT DESIGN 1: SIMULATION SETUP 










The triangular distribution is a continuous probability distribution with minimum, maximum, and likely scores for p1h and c1h. 
Figure 27 illustrates the triangular distributions from Table 15. 
 
Figure 27.  Triangular Distributions Project Design 1136 
                                                 
136 Frontline Systems, “Large-Scale LP/QP Solver Engine,” Frontline Systems. Figure 27 illustrates a triangular distribution for Cells I7 and I8 respectively. 
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The histogram in Figure 28 suggests that when the analyst sets the “lower cutoff” 
rehabilitation score equal to 24.0, the following occur: 
1. For a permissive environment, the maximum amount of rehabilitation 
would be approximately 32.7(a 50.7 percent chance). 
2. For an uncertain environment, the likely amount of rehabilitation would be 
approximately 24.2. 
3. For a hostile environment, the minimum amount of rehabilitation would 
be approximately 16.9 (a 49.3 percent chance). 
 
Figure 28.  Project Design 1: Analysis of Forecasted Rehabilitation137 
The sensitivity analysis in Figure 29 suggests that the development scenario (or 
Cell: I5) has a more significant impact than the scores for p1h and c1h (Cells I7 and I8 
respectively). Ultimately the threat level of the environment has a bigger impact than the  
 
 




scores for communes and projects. However, the project score has a larger impact than 
the commune score. Figure 29 is a sensitivity analysis of the input data for communes 
receiving Project Design 1. 
 
Figure 29.  Project Design 1: Sensitivity Analysis of Forecasted Rehabilitation138 
C. PROJECT DESIGN 2: SIMULATION SETUP 
Table 16 illustrates the Monte Carlo simulation setup for Project Design 2. 
Table 16.   Rehabilitation Forecast for Project Design 2 




The triangular distribution is a continuous probability distribution with minimum, maximum, and likely scores for p2h and c2h. 
Figure 30 illustrates the triangular distributions from Table 16. 
 
Figure 30.  Triangular Distributions Project Design 2139 
                                                 
139 Ibid. Figure 30 illustrates a triangular distribution for Cells I7 and I8 respectively. 
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The histogram in Figure 31 reflects the rehabilitation scores for Project Design 2. 
 
Figure 31.  Project Design 2: Analysis of Forecasted Rehabilitation140 
The histogram in Figure 31 suggests that when the analyst sets the “lower cutoff” 
rehabilitation score equal to 33.5, the following occur: 
4. For a permissive environment, the maximum amount of rehabilitation 
would be approximately 42.9 (a 49.7 percent chance). 
5. For an uncertain environment, the likely amount of rehabilitation would be 
approximately 33.5. 
6. For a hostile environment, the minimum amount of rehabilitation would 
be approximately 25.2 (a 50.3 percent chance). 
The sensitivity analysis in Figure 16 suggests that the development scenario (or 
Cell: I5) has a more significant impact than the scores for p2h and c2h (Cells I7 and I8 




respectively). Ultimately the threat level of the environment has a bigger impact than the 
scores for communes and projects. However, the project score has a larger impact than 
the commune score. Figure 32 is a sensitivity analysis of the input data for communes 
receiving Project Design 2. 
 
Figure 32.  Project Design 2: Sensitivity Analysis of Forecasted Rehabilitation141 
D. PROJECT DESIGN 3: SIMULATION SETUP 
Table 17 illustrates the Monte Carlo simulation setup for Project Design 3. 
Table 17.   Rehabilitation Forecast for Project Design 3 




The triangular distribution is a continuous probability distribution with minimum, maximum, and likely scores for p3h and c3h. 
Figure 33 illustrates the triangular distributions from Table 17. 
 
Figure 33.  Triangular Distributions Project Design 3142 
                                                 
142 Ibid. Figure 33 illustrates a triangular distribution for Cells I7 and I8 respectively. 
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The histogram in Figure 34 reflects the rehabilitation scores for Project Design 3. 
 
Figure 34.  Project Design 3: Analysis of Forecasted Rehabilitation143 
The histogram in Figure 34 suggests that when the analyst sets the “lower cutoff” 
rehabilitation score equal to 21.9, the following occur: 
1. For a permissive environment, the maximum amount of rehabilitation 
would be approximately 29.7 (a 48.5 percent chance). 
2. For an uncertain environment, the likely amount of rehabilitation would be 
approximately 21.9. 
3. For a hostile environment, the minimum amount of rehabilitation would 
be approximately 15.2 (a 51.5 percent chance). 
The sensitivity analysis in Figure 35 suggests that the development scenario (or 
Cell: I5) has a more significant impact than the scores for p3h and c3h (Cells I7 and I8 




respectively). Ultimately the threat level of the environment has a bigger impact than the 
scores for communes and projects. However, the project score has a larger impact than 
the commune score. Figure 35 is a sensitivity analysis of the input data for communes 
receiving Project Design 3. 
 
Figure 35.  Project Design 3: Sensitivity Analysis of Forecasted Rehabilitation144 
E. PROJECT DESIGN 4: SIMULATION SETUP 
Table 18 illustrates the Monte Carlo simulation setup for Project Design 4. 
Table 18.   Rehabilitation Forecast for Project Design 4 




The triangular distribution is a continuous probability distribution with minimum, maximum, and likely scores for p4h and c4h. 
Figure 36 illustrates the triangular distributions from Table 18. 
 
Figure 36.  Triangular Distributions Project Design 3145 
                                                 
145 Ibid. Figure 20 illustrates a triangular distribution for Cells I7 and I8 respectively. 
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The histogram in Figure 37 reflects the rehabilitation scores for Project Design 4. 
 
Figure 37.  Project Design 4: Analysis of Forecasted Rehabilitation146 
The histogram in Figure 37 suggests that when the analyst sets the “lower cutoff” 
rehabilitation score equal to 7.30, the following occur: 
1. For a permissive environment, the maximum amount of rehabilitation 
would be approximately 12.4 (a 48.6 percent chance). 
2. For an uncertain environment, the likely amount of rehabilitation would be 
approximately 7.29. 
3. For a hostile environment, the minimum amount of rehabilitation would 
be approximately 3.10 (a 51.4 percent chance). 




The sensitivity analysis in Figure 38 suggests that the development scenario (or 
Cell: I5) has a more significant impact than the scores for p4h and c4h (Cells I7 and I8 
respectively). Ultimately the threat level of the environment has a bigger impact than the 
scores for communes and projects. However, the project score has a larger impact than 
the commune score. Figure 38 is a sensitivity analysis of the input data for communes 
receiving Project Design 4. 
 
Figure 38.  Project Design 4: Sensitivity Analysis of Forecasted Rehabilitation147
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APPENDIX F. DETAILED SETUP OF MODEL I 
This Appendix outlines the detail calculations for Chapter VI, Section B. 
A. SETS AND INDICES IN DETAIL 
Let ic  be the quality score for each commune i; where 




   














jp  be the quality score for each project j; where 



















For projects denoted as 1p , 6 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 2p , 8 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 3p , 7 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 4p , 3 projects are available. 
In all, there are a total of 24 projects available.  
B. COEFFICIENTS 
Let Qij be the rehabilitation score, which is the difference between the quality 
scores for project j and commune i.  
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    
( )
and   1,..., 47 ,  1,2,3,4
ij j iQ p c
i j
  
   (31) 
C. DECISION VARIABLES 
The optimization model uses  ijx  for its decision variables. 
Let xij be the binary decision variable, 
 
   
1    if project  is assigned to commune  
where  
0   otherwise











D. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION  








  (33) 
E. CONSTRAINTS 
 Equations 34 to 80 are covering constraints ensuring that each commune i 
is served by at least one project j 
 
1 2 32 34 46
Covering,  1 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j
commune
x x x x x    
 (34) 
 
1 2 3 7 19 34 46
Covering,  2 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x      
 (35) 
 
2 3 4 7 19 20 23
Covering,  3 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x      
 (36) 
 
 3 4 5 7 8 9 13 23 24
Covering,  4 is served by a project(s)
1j j j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x x x        
 (37) 
 
 4 5 6 9 10 18 24 25
Covering,  5 is served by a project(s)
1j j j j j j j j
commune





5 6 10 11 18
Covering,  6 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j
commune
x x x x x    
 (39) 
 
 2 3 4 7 8 46
Covering,  7 is served by a project(s)
1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (40) 
 
4 7 8 9 13 46 47
Covering,  8 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x      
 (41) 
 
4 5 8 9 10 13 14
Covering,  9 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x      
 (42) 
 
5 6 9 10 11 12 14
Covering,  10 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x      
 (43) 
 
6 10 11 12
Covering,  11 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j
commune




Covering,  12 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j
commune
x x x  
 (45) 
 
4 8 9 13 14 47
Covering,  13 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (46) 
 
9 10 13 14
Covering,  14 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j
commune
x x x x   
 (47) 
 
15 16 19 20 22 31
Covering,  15 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (48) 
 
15 16 17 20 22
Covering,  16 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j
commune
x x x x x    
 (49) 
 
16 17 18 22
Covering,  17 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j
commune
x x x x   
 (50) 
 
5 6 17 18 22 25
Covering,  18 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (51) 
 
2 3 15 19 20 31 33 34
Covering,  19 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x x       
 (52) 
 
3 15 16 19 20 21 22 23 24
Covering,  20 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x x x        
 (53) 
 
 20 21 22 23 24 25
Covering,  21 is served by a project(s)
1j j j j j j
commune





15 16 17 18 20 21 22 24 25
Covering,  22 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x x x        
 (55) 
 
 3 4 20 21 23 24
Covering,  23 is served by a project(s)
1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (56) 
 
4 5 20 21 23 24 25
Covering,  24 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x      
 (57) 
 
5 18 21 22 24 25
Covering,  25 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (58) 
 
26 27 31 35
Covering,  26 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j
commune
x x x x   
 (59) 
 
26 27 28 31 40
Covering,  27 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j
commune
x x x x x    
 (60) 
 
27 28 29 31 41
Covering,  28 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j
commune
x x x x x    
 (61) 
 
 28 29 30 31 32 40 41
Covering,  29 is served by a project(s)
1j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x      
 (62) 
 
29 30 31 34 42 44
Covering,  30 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (63) 
 
15 19 26 27 28 29 30 31 33 34
Covering,  31 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x x x x         
 (64) 
 
 1 30 32 34 44 46
Covering,  32 is served by a project(s)
1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (65) 
 
19 30 31 33 34
Covering,  33 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j
commune
x x x x x    
 (66) 
 
1 2 19 30 31 32 33 34
Covering,  34 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x x       
 (67) 
 
26 35 36 40
Covering,  35 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j
commune
x x x x   
 (68) 
 
35 36 37 38 39 40
Covering,  36 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j
commune




Covering,  37 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j
commune





36 37 38 39
Covering,  38 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j
commune
x x x x   
 (71) 
 
36 38 39 40 41
Covering,  39 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j
commune
x x x x x    
 (72) 
 
26 35 36 39 40 41
Covering,  40 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (73) 
 
29 30 39 40 41 42 43
Covering,  41 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x      
 (74) 
 
30 32 41 42 43 44 45
Covering,  42 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x      
 (75) 
 
41 42 43 45
Covering,  43 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j
commune
x x x x   
 (76) 
 
30 32 42 44 45 46
Covering,  44 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (77) 
 
 42 43 44 45 46 47
Covering,  45 is served by a project(s)
1j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x     
 (78) 
 
1 2 7 8 32 44 45 46 47
Covering,  46 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j j j j j
commune
x x x x x x x x x        
 (79) 
 8 13 45 46 47
Covering,  47 is served by a project(s)
( ) 1j j j j j
commune
x x x x x      (80) 
Equations 81 to 84 are supply constraints ensuring that every project j is assigned 
to at most one commune i. 
 
11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 111 121 131
141 151 161 171 181 191 201 211 221 231 241 251
261 271 281 291 301 311 321 3
Supply of project 1,  of which 6 are availablej
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x

            
           
       31 341 351 361 371
381 391 401 411 421 431 441 451 461 471
6
x x x x




     





12 22 32 42 52 62 72 82 92 102 112 122 132
142 152 162 172 182 192 202 212 222 232 242 252
262 272 282 292 302 312 322 3
Supply of project 2,  of which 8 are availablej
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x

            
           
       32 342 352 362 372
382 392 402 412 422 432 442 452 462 472
8
x x x x




     
           
 (82) 
 
13 23 33 43 53 63 73 83 93 103 113 123 133
143 153 163 173 183 193 203 213 223 233 243 253
263 273 283 293 303 313 32
Supply of project 3,  of which 7 are available    j
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x

            
           
      3 333 343 353 363 373
383 393 403 413 423 433 443 453 463 473
7
x x x x x




      
           
 (83) 
 
14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 94 104 114 124 134
144 154 164 174 184 194 204 214 224 234 244 254
264 274 284 294 304 314 324 3
Supply of project 4,  of which 3 are availablej
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x

            
           
       34 344 354 364 374
384 394 404 414 424 434 444 454 464 474
3
x x x x




     
           
 (84) 
Equations 85 to 131 are demand constraints, ensuring that every commune i 
receives at most one project j. 
 11 12 13 14Demand from  1 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (85) 
 21 22 23 24Demand from  2 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (86) 
 31 32 33 34Demand from  3 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (87) 
 41 42 43 44Demand from  4 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (88) 
 51 52 53 54Demand from  5 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (89) 
 61 62 63 64Demand from  6 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (90) 
 71 72 73 74Demand from  7 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (91) 
 81 82 83 84Demand from  8 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (92) 
 91 92 93 94Demand from  9 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (93) 
 101 102 103 104Demand from  10 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (94) 
 111 112 113 114Demand from  11 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (95) 
 121 122 123 124Demand from  12 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (96) 
 131 132 133 134Demand from  13 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (97) 
 141 142 143 144Demand from  14 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (98) 
 151 152 153 154Demand from  15 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (99) 
 161 162 163 164Demand from  16 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (100) 
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 171 172 173 174Demand from  17 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (101) 
 181 182 183 184Demand from  18 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (102) 
 191 192 193 194Demand from  19 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (103) 
 201 202 203 204Demand from  20 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (104) 
 211 212 213 214Demand from  21 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (105) 
 221 222 223 224Demand from  22 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (106) 
 231 232 233 234Demand from  23 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (107) 
 241 242 243 244Demand from  24 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (108) 
 251 252 253 254Demand from  25 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (109) 
 261 262 263 264Demand from  26 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (110) 
 271 272 273 274Demand from  27 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (111) 
 281 282 283 284Demand from  28 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (112) 
 291 292 293 294Demand from  29 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (113) 
 301 302 303 304Demand from  30 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (114) 
 311 312 313 314Demand from  31 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (115) 
 321 322 323 324Demand from  32 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (116) 
 331 332 333 334Demand from  33 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (117) 
 341 342 343 344Demand from  34 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (118) 
 351 352 353 354Demand from  35 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (119) 
 361 362 363 364Demand from  36 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (120) 
 371 372 373 374Demand from  37 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (121) 
 381 382 383 384Demand from  38 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (122) 
 391 392 393 394Demand from  39 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (123) 
 401 402 403 404Demand from  40 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (124) 
 411 412 413 414Demand from  41 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (125) 
 421 422 423 424Demand from  42 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (126) 
 431 432 433 434Demand from  43 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (127) 
 441 442 443 444Demand from  44 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (128) 
 451 452 453 454Demand from  45 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (129) 
 461 462 463 464Demand from  46 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (130) 
 471 472 473 474Demand from  47 for project    ( ) 1commune j x x x x     (131) 
Equations 132 to 139 are “brute” demand constraints that assign at least one 










































































  (139) 
Equation 140 is a binary constraint, which forces the analyst to select or reject (1 
or 0) the assignment of a project j to a commune i.  
 1 or 0  (for all  and )ijx i j  (140) 
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APPENDIX G. DETAILED SETUP OF MODEL II 
This Appendix outlines the detail calculations for Chapter VI, Section C. 
A. SETS AND INDICES IN DETAIL 
Let 'ic  be the quality score for each commune i; where 






' '    
2 2
'  quality score  for commune 
discrete subset of communes , which are adjacent to '
















    






Let ' jp  be the quality score for each project j; where 



















For projects denoted as 1'p , 6 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 2'p , 8 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 3'p , 7 projects are available. 
For projects denoted as 4'p , 3 projects are available. 
In all, there are a total of 24 projects available.  
B. COEFFICIENTS 
Let Qij be the rehabilitation score, which is the difference between the quality 
scores for project j and commune i.  
1

























   
' ( ' ' )
and   1,..., 47 ,  1,2,3,4





C. DECISION VARIABLES 
The optimization model uses  'ijx  for its decision variables. 
Let  'ijx be the binary decision variable, 
    
1    if project '  is assigned to commune  
where  '
0   otherwise









   (144) 
D. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION  








  (145) 
E. CONSTRAINTS 
Equations 146 to 149 are supply constraints ensuring that every project j is 
assigned to at most one commune i. 
 
11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 111 121 131
141 151 161 171 181 191 201 211 221 231 241 251
261 271
Supply of project 1,  of which 6 are available
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' '
j
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x

            
           
  281 291 301 311 321 331 341 351 361 371
381 391 401 411 421 431 441 451 461 471
6
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
x x x x x x x x x x




          
           
(146) 
 
12 22 32 42 52 62 72 82 92 102 112 122 132
142 152 162 172 182 192 202 212 222 232 242 252
262 272
Supply of project 2,  of which 8 are available
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' '
j
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x

            
           
  282 292 302 312 322 332 342 352 362 372
382 392 402 412 422 432 442 452 462 472
8
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
x x x x x x x x x x




          





13 23 33 43 53 63 73 83 93 103 113 123 133
143 153 163 173 183 193 203 213 223 233 243 253
263
Supply of project 3,  of which 7 are available    
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' '
j
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x

            
           
 273 283 293 303 313 323 333 343 353 363 373
383 393 403 413 423 433 443 453 463 473
7
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
x x x x x x x x x x




           
           
(148) 
 
14 24 34 44 54 64 74 84 94 104 114 124 134
144 154 164 174 184 194 204 214 224 234 244 254
264 274
Supply of project 4,  of which 3 are available
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' '
j
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x x x x
x x

            
           
  284 294 304 314 324 334 344 354 364 374
384 394 404 414 424 434 444 454 464 474
3
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
x x x x x x x x x x




          
           
(149) 
Equations 150 to 196 are demand constraints ensuring that every commune i 
receives at most one project j. 
 11 12 13 14Demand from  1 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (150) 
 21 22 23 24Demand from  2 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (151) 
 31 32 33 34Demand from  3 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (152) 
 41 42 43 44Demand from  4 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (153) 
 51 52 53 54Demand from  5 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (154) 
 61 62 63 64Demand from  6 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (155) 
 71 72 73 74Demand from  7 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (156) 
 81 82 83 84Demand from  8 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (157) 
 91 92 93 94Demand from  9 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (158) 
 101 102 103 104Demand from  10 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (159) 
 111 112 113 114Demand from  11 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (160) 
 121 122 123 124Demand from  12 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (161) 
 131 132 133 134Demand from  13 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (162) 
 141 142 143 144Demand from  14 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (163) 
 151 152 153 154Demand from  15 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (164) 
 161 162 163 164Demand from  16 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (165) 
 171 172 173 174Demand from  17 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (166) 
 181 182 183 184Demand from  18 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (167) 
 191 192 193 194Demand from  19 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (168) 
 201 202 203 204Demand from  20 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (169) 
 211 212 213 214Demand from  21 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (170) 
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 221 222 223 224Demand from  22 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (171) 
 231 232 233 234Demand from  23 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (172) 
 241 242 243 244Demand from  24 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (173) 
 251 252 253 254Demand from  25 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (174) 
 261 262 263 264Demand from  26 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (175) 
 271 272 273 274Demand from  27 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (176) 
 281 282 283 284Demand from  28 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (177) 
 291 292 293 294Demand from  29 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (178) 
 301 302 303 304Demand from  30 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (179) 
 311 312 313 314Demand from  31 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (180) 
 321 322 323 324Demand from  32 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (181) 
 331 332 333 334Demand from  33 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (182) 
 341 342 343 344Demand from  34 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (183) 
 351 352 353 354Demand from  35 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (184) 
 361 362 363 364Demand from  36 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (185) 
 371 372 373 374Demand from  37 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (186) 
 381 382 383 384Demand from  38 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (187) 
 391 392 393 394Demand from  39 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (188) 
 401 402 403 404Demand from  40 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (189) 
 411 412 413 414Demand from  41 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (190) 
 421 422 423 424Demand from  42 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (191) 
 431 432 433 434Demand from  43 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (192) 
 441 442 443 444Demand from  44 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (193) 
 451 452 453 454Demand from  45 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (194) 
 461 462 463 464Demand from  46 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (195) 
 471 472 473 474Demand from  47 for project    ( ' ' ' ' ) 1commune j x x x x     (196) 
Equations 197 to 204 are “brute” demand constraints that assign at least one 










































































  (204) 
Equation 205 is a binary constraint, which forces the analyst to select or reject (1 
or 0) the assignment of a project j to a commune i. 
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APPENDIX H. COMPUTER ANALYSES 
A. SETUP IN MICROSOFT EXCEL WITH RISK SOLVER PLATFORM 
Frontline Systems’ Risk-Solver Platform (RSP) add-in tool allows the decision 
analyst to handle conventional optimization, simulation optimization, and stochastic 
optimization problems.148 Additionally, the analyst can perform predictive and 
prescriptive analytics, while handling up to 8,000 decision variables (40 times larger than 
the Excel Solver) by using one of the seven built-in advanced Solver engines (e.g., 
LP/Quadratic, SOCP Barrier, Interval Global and Evolutionary Solvers).149 Decision 
analysts have the ability to find better solutions to leverage better optimization algorithms 
and the advanced PSI Interpreter (or The Polymorphic Spreadsheet Interpreter). The PSI 
interpreter analyzes the model in many ways not possible with the Excel recalculator:150 
1. Analysts can diagnose the model as an LP, quadratic programming, 
smooth nonlinear, or non-smooth optimization model, and automatically 
select Solver engines suitable for the model. In addition, it pinpoints 
formulas that make the model nonlinear or non-smooth. 
2. Analysts can compute derivatives of the problem functions directly, using 
the methods of automatic differentiation, which is faster and more 
accurate than the method of formula recalculation and “finite 
differencing” used by the Excel Solver and Premium Solver. 
3. Analysts can compute interval values for Excel formulas in the model, in 
addition to simple numeric values, which the Interval Global Solver uses 
to find globally optimal solutions to optimization problems 
B. MODEL I: RSP SETUP AND RESULTS 
See Table 19 for the RSP Excel setup of Model I.151 
.
                                                 
148 Frontline Systems, FrontlineSolvers: Risk Solver Platform Add-In (Incline Village, NV: Frontline 
Systems, 2013) http://www.solver.com/risk–solver–platform.  
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 








See Figure 39 for the Risk Solver Platform model specifications for Model I. 
 
Figure 39.  Risk Solver Platform Model Specifications: Model I152 
The Risk Solver Platform Solver add-in used the “Standard LP/Quadratic Engine” 
to solve for an optimal allocation of rehabilitation based on rehabilitation scores. Also, 
RSP conducted an automated test for convexity and diagnosed the model as LP Convex. 
Geometrically, the constraints and objective function are convex, because line segments 
could be drawn from point(s) (x, f(x)) to other point(s) (y, f(y)). 
                                                 
152 Frontline Systems, “Large-Scale LP/QP Solver Engine,” Frontline Systems. 
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See Figure 40 for the RSP output, which outlines RSP’s diagnosis of Model I. 
 
Figure 40.  Risk Solver Platform Output: Model I153 
C. MODEL II: RSP SETUP AND RESULTS 
See Table 20 for the Risk Solver Platform Excel setup for Model II. 








See Figure 41 for the Risk Solver Platform model specifications for Model II. 
 








See Figure 42 for the RSP output, which outlines RSP’s diagnosis of the model 
for Model II. 
 
Figure 42.  Risk Solver Platform Output for Model II155 




Table 21 illustrates the upgradeable options that Frontline Solvers offers. 
Table 21.   Comparisons: Frontline Solver Upgrades to the Basic Solver156 
 
                                                 




APPENDIX I. AN INSPIRATION FOR MODELING 
CONSTRAINTS 
After prototyping the BIP model during the embryonic stage of formulation, it 
seemed that the model resembled certain aspects of wéiqí. Wéiqí or “Go” is a two-player 
board game (usually with a 19×19 grid), laden with tactics and strategy, which originated 
in ancient China more than two millennia ago. Although the situation in Mali is a 
multiple n-player game of state actors, international organizations, private organizations, 
and non-state actors, the finer points of strategy and tactics are the most interesting 
aspects of wéiqí that this thesis focuses on to derive various algorithms and constraints.  
The goal of wéiqí is for a player to place his stones (black or white stones) to 
envelop a greater total area of the board than the opposing player. As the players 
alternately place their stones on the board, the stones may not move, unless the opposing 
player captures it. Movement is nonlinear (that is, a stone may be placed almost 
anywhere on the board on any move). To capture an opponent’s stones, a player must 
surround an opposing stone or group of stones by creating a cordon or occupying every 
orthogonally-adjacent intersection (i.e., a set of mutually perpendicular axes). The players 
continue playing in this fashion until both players decide to quite playing or making 
subsequent moves. 
Similar to the real world, wéiqí does not have a set condition for the endgame. 
Unless a player yields, the player with the most points wins the game. To tally the score, 
the following scoring takes place: (1) a count of controlled territory (or intersections), (2) 
the number of captured stones, and (3) the white stone handicap (known as komi) of 
points added to the white player’s score. Strategy, not scoring, is the take away. 
Wéiqí is a reminder of why leaders must develop strategy and policy to account 
for global influence. While keeping the entire board in mind, during the tactical and 
operational level fighting, decision makers must always maintain a strategic advantage, 
even if it means a tactical loss. The most basic maxim of wéiqí is optimizing the number 
of courses of action remaining for a stone or group of stones, after a tactical level conflict 
has occurred, called aij. The notion of aij must inspire every maneuver and course of 
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action. A decision analyst owes it to a decision maker to answer the question: do I still 
have aij with this move and what are the cascading effects of future move with residual 
aij? Figure 43 serves as a visual representation of the wéiqí board with stones, which 
motivated the use of IP modeling to operationalize the conflict. 
 
Figure 43.  Wéiqí or “Go”: A Two-Player Board Game 
Like irregular warfare, wéiqí is difficult to learn and execute well. Novices who 
do not appreciate the subtleties and nuances of the minor concepts of the game will suffer 
as the game progresses. In that vein of inexperience, decision analysts owe it to decision 
makers to eliminate the rookie moves of randomly placing stones on the board, as if it 
were a probabilistic game of chance. Just as information, maneuver, and combat power 
advantages aid a player in irregular warfare, a weaker wéiqí player will eventually lose to 
the more experienced player who fashions optimal formations and appreciates the 
strategic placement and contiguous connections of stones for greater power. Ultimately, a 
superior wéiqí player understands the highly dynamic balance between power, control, 
territory, and influence.  
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APPENDIX J. THE PROBLEM IN NORTHERN MALI  
A. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE HISTORY OF MALI 
As with any problem, a decision analyst must consider the history and nature of 
the conflict. Analysts can go as far back as 300 A.D. or begin at the rise and fall of 





 centuries, perhaps the more interesting starting point of Malian history 
would be the famed empires of the Sahel region. Mali was once part of the three 
legendary Sahelian empires that ruled the Sahel region and Trans Saharan trade routes. 
From the Ghana Empire to the Mali and Songhai Empires, the Sahelian people thrived 
from trade and the spread of Islam. More specifically, analysts can study the rule of the 
Songhai Empire’s control of the Gao and Tombouctou regions and the events leading to 
the Moroccan invasion of Tombouctou. 
However, to truly understand the deep-rooted sentiment that exists in Northern 
Mali today, analysts can choose to start with France’s control in the late 19th century and 
subjugation of Mali in the early 1900s, the dubbing of the colony as French Sudan in 
1920, membership of the French Union in the mid-1940s, or its independence from 
France in 1960. Since the 1960s, the Republic of Mali received aid from China, Russia, 
Europe, and other Western nations.  
B. LESSONS LEARNED: CHINA’S SUCCESS 
Learning from the Chinese experience in 1968 could be worthwhile. Although 
China briefly struggled with its influence over the region in the late 1960s, its well-placed 
surrogates guaranteed the influence it wields today. Learning how China maintained its 
influence even through the bloodless military coup in late 1968 would be worthwhile and 
highly relevant to the current state of affairs. Western nations can learn something from 
China’s resiliency in maintaining its influence, while Mali transitioned from a 





2012, military coup d’état in 2012, and Democratic rule today. What did China do right 
that everyone else continually fails to do? If not China, can decision analysts learn from 
the successes of past Malian leaders? 
C. LESSONS LEARNED: FORMER AFRICAN LEADERS 
President Alpha Oumar Konaré, former democratic President of Mali and first 
Chairperson of the African Union Commission, is a relevant change agent who is 
certainly worth studying. President Konaré’s political savvy began in the late 1960s, and 
his influence continued through the early 2000s. The military coup d’état and resultant 
23-year military rule of President Konaré really shaped his political ideology. Starting out 
as the Secretary General of the Sudanese Union/African Democratic Rally (US-RDA) in 
1967 and later becoming a staunch activist of Marxism-Leninism, due to the military 
coup d’état, decision analysts can learn about the ever changing dynamic of the region 
and various influences affecting Bamako politics in the national capital city of Mali. By 
1990, President Konaré shifted to actively supporting a Democratic ideology called 
ADEMA (Alliance pour la Démocratie en Mali). Again, this significant shift from his 
activist days of supporting the clandestine Marxist-Leninist movement, known as the 
Malian Party for Work (PMT or Parti malien du travail), should give analyst an idea of 
the patience and understanding needed to operate in the Sahel region.  
By 1992, President Konaré became Mali’s first democratically elected president, 
and throughout his first and second terms, Mali’s political and social stability served as a 
model for other African nations. However, in the early 1990s, President Konaré fought 
the Tuaregs due to a sentiment of lack of commonality with the black African majority, 
and political and cultural marginalization. Before the end of his first term, President 
Konaré ushered a peace accord with the Tuaregs in 1995, which resulted in thousands of 
Tuareg refugees returning to Northern Mali’s desert region. By his second term, the 
international community was applauding President Konaré’s efforts to revitalize Mali’s 
economy, by increasing foreign investment and making Mali the one of largest cotton 




West African States apparatus (ECOWAS), Western nations lauded President Konaré’s 
peace brokering of the conflicts in the sub-Sahara (between Sierra Leone, Liberia, and 
Guinea).  
Likewise, decision analysts should study the rise and fall of former President 
Amadou Toumani Touré who orchestrated the 1991 coup d’état freeing Mali from 
military rule and the subsequent coup d’état that led to his fall in 2012. What went wrong 
from the time that President Konaré signed the 1995 peace agreement to the 2006 
rebellion and rebel activities that continue to persist? In June 2006, President Touré 
signed a peace agreement to end the Tuareg rebellion, and he guaranteed development 
and anti-poverty programs for Northern Mali. Within a year, the Tuaregs reconvened its 
rebel activities and began kidnapping soldiers. By early 2009, the Malian military 
regained controlled many Tuareg strongholds, which greatly reduced the Tuareg’s ability 
to fight and displaced many of the rebels who turned to Libya. However, recognizing the 
Tuareg situation and sentiment, Muammar al-Qaddafi championed, armed, and equipped 
the Tuaregs for his personal force protection. Naturally the fall of al-Qaddafi led to the 
hasty return of the newly emboldened Tuareg fighters, but not before raiding arms and 
ammunition depots on their way back to their strongholds in Northern Mali. 
D. CRISIS ACTION MODE: NOT LEARNING FROM HISTORY 
After scoring key victories and decisively defeating and demoralizing the Malian 
defense force, the country’s military overthrew the government, raided the presidential 
palace, and revoked the constitution. Within a matter of days, the rebels colluded with al-
Qaida and its affiliates to seize most of the Northern Mali. Within weeks, the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) rebels unilaterally declared their 
independence and declared the Independent State of the Azawad (which controls 
Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, and pockets of Mopti). Why did Western nations believe that 
Mali was among the most stable democracies in Africa? What did President Touré do to 
lose the trust of the military that once revered him and later set the conditions for the 
rebels to gain decisive control of Northern Mali? If analysts can understand these basic 
questions, they can offer salient and meaningful recommendations to decision makers  
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E. THE AFTERMATH 
Low- and mid-level soldiers, frustrated with the poor handling of the rebellion 
overthrew Toure on 22 March. Intensive mediation efforts led by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) returned power to a civilian 
administration in April with the appointment of interim President Dioncounda Traore. 
The post-coup chaos led to rebels expelling the Malian military from the three northern 
regions of the country and allowed Islamic militants to set up strongholds. Hundreds of 
thousands of northern Malians fled the violence to southern Mali and neighboring 
countries, exacerbating regional food insecurity in host communities. An international 
military intervention to retake the three northern regions began in January 2013 and 
within a month most of the north had been retaken. In a democratic presidential election 
conducted in July and August of 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected president in 
the second round. What actions should the U.S. and its allies take next? What does 





Figure 44 illustrates the aftermath of the military coup in Mali.  
 
Figure 44.  Aftermath of the Military Coup in Mali: 30 March to 01 April 2012157  
 
                                                 
157 Tom Hayden, “The Long War Reaches Mali,” The Huffington Post, sec. Politics, December, 2012. 
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Figure 45 reflects the timeline of the events before and after the military coup d’état (October 2011 to January 2014). 
 
Figure 45.  Mali: Timeline of Selected Recent Events158 
                                                 
158 Arieff, Crisis in Mali, 5. 
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APPENDIX K. THE DIRECT APPROACH 
Agence France-Presse (AFP) illustrated the contributions of African and Western 
militaries in support of the French–Mali intervention in Northern Mali. As France leads 
counterterrorism operations, Western allies continue to offer limited logistics and 
transportation support while African regional security apparatuses provide direct support. 
Figure 46 illustrates CT operations as a direct approach, as discussed in the thesis. 
  
Figure 46.  Direct Approach: Coalitions Supporting France in Mali159 
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